Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court answered a question of law certified by the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee by holding that Tenn. Code Ann. 56-7-111 does not provide for a private right of action.Section 56-7-111 states that when an insured property owner's home or other structure sustains more than $1,000 in damages, the casualty or property insurance company shall name the general contractor of an uncompleted construction contract as a payee when issuing payment to the property owner. In the instant case, the insurance company issued a check to the owner but did not name the general contractor as a payee. The general contractor brought this suit alleging that the insurance company did not comply with section 56-7-111. The federal court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether a general contractor has a private right of action against an insurance company for violating section 56-7-111. The Supreme Court held that the statute does not expressly grant such a private right of action and that the legislature did not intend to imply a private right of action. View "Affordable Construction Services, Inc. v. Auto-Owners Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this appeal in a capital case, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of criminal appeals affirming Defendant's convictions and sentence, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claims of error.After a second trial, a jury found Defendant guilty of first-degree premeditated murder, murder in the perpetration of robbery, and aggravated robbery. Defendant was sentenced to death. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) double jeopardy principles did not bar retrial on the felony murder count; (2) alleged prosecutorial misconduct in the first trial did not bar Defendant's retrial; (3) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's motion to suppress, in admitting evidence of Defendant's prior convictions for rape and assault of the victim and in admitting evidence of Defendant's escape attempts; (4) imposition of the death penalty was not arbitrary; and (5) the sentence of death was neither excessive nor disproportionate. View "State v. Rimmer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of criminal appeals reversing the trial court's order denying Petitioner's motion to correct an illegal sentence under Tenn. R. Crim. P. 36.1, holding that Petitioner's sentence was voidable, not void and illegal.Petitioner pled guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to sell and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The firearm sentence was enhanced pursuant to the criminal gang enhancement statute. Thereafter, in State v. Bonds, 502 S.W.3d 118 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2016), the court of criminal appeals declared the criminal gang enhancement statute unconstitutional. Instead of filing a postconviction petition challenging his guilty plea Petitioner filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Petitioner's sentence was rendered void and thus illegal under Bonds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78 (Tenn. 1999), Petitioner's sentence was voidable, not void and illegal; and (2) therefore, Petitioner was not entitled to relief under Rule 36.1. View "State v. Reid" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of criminal appeals and vacated the decision of the trial court to grant Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal as to an aggravated child neglect charge, holding that a reasonable jury could have found the necessary elements of the crime of aggravated child neglect.Following the death of her infant child, Defendant was convicted of reckless homicide and aggravated child neglect. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal as to the aggravated child neglect charge. The court of criminal appeals affirmed, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Defendant knowingly neglected her child. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a reasonable jury could have concluded that Defendant knowingly neglected her child by not feeding her and her child died as a result. View "State v. Weems" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' action seeking a declaratory judgment concerning the rights and obligations of the parties under a 2001 contract, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that dismissal was appropriate on the grounds that the complaint was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.In a previously filed action, Plaintiffs sought similar relief, but the case was dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In the instant case, the trial court granted Defendants' motions to dismiss, finding that Plaintiffs lacked standing. The court of appeals affirmed on other grounds, concluding that res judicata barred the complaint and, as such, declined to address the standing issue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that dismissal of the previous case did not constitute an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata. The Court then remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of the standing issue. View "Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Memphis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of criminal appeals dismissing Defendant's appeal and dismissed Defendant's convictions for possession with the intent to deliver more than twenty-six grams of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia, holding that the initial search of Defendant's house during which law enforcement discovered illegal contraband was unlawful.Defendant pled guilty but specifically reserved a certified question of law pertaining to the legality of the search in this case. The court of criminal appeals dismissed the appeal, determining that the certified question was not dispositive because the evidence would have been admissible notwithstanding the search in question under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the inevitable discovery doctrine did not apply in this case; and (2) the State did not carry its burden of proving that either exigent circumstances or voluntary consent justified their warrantless search of Defendant's home. View "State v. Scott" on Justia Law

In this parental termination case, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court terminating Father's parental rights, holding that the trial court misapplied the missing witness rule and in applying the doctrine of unclean hands to Father and that the evidence of abandonment was not clear and convincing.The trial court terminated Father's parental rights based on a finding of abandonment by willful failure to support, willful failure to make reasonable or consistent support payments, and willful failure to visit and further found that termination was in the child's best interests. In reaching its conclusions, the trial court applied the missing witness rule and the doctrine of unclean hands. The court of appeals reversed, concluding, among other things, that the trial court erred by applying the missing witness rule in a non-jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment with the exception of its holding on the missing witness rule, holding (1) while the missing witness rule may apply in a non-jury trial, the trial court misapplied the rule in this case; (2) the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of unclean hands to Father; and (3) there was not clear and convincing evidence that Father abandoned the child. View "In re Mattie L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of criminal appeals affirming Defendant's convictions for two counts of delivering marijuana and two counts of money laundering, holding that the evidence was insufficient to support one of the money laundering convictions.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the evidence supporting the first money laundering conviction was legally sufficient; (2) the evidence was insufficient with respect to the second money laundering conviction; (3) Defendant's punishment for both delivery of marijuana and money laundering does not violate double jeopardy protections; and (4) the money laundering statute is not unconstitutionally vague by virtue of its use of the undefined phrase "carrying on." View "State v. Allison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a claim for wrongful termination of employment could not be asserted under the Teacher Tenure Act, Tenn. Code Ann. 49-5-501 to -515, by classifying a tenured teacher's resignation as a constructive discharge rather than a voluntary quit.After Plaintiff, a tenured teacher, quit her teaching position she sued for wrongful termination under the Teacher Tenure Act, alleging that she was constructively discharged. The amended complaint also asserted other claims. The trial court granted summary judgment against Plaintiff. The appellate court reversed the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim under the Act, concluding that the doctrine of constructive discharge could give rise to a wrongful termination claim under the Act. The court of appeals otherwise affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) constructive discharge is not applicable to wrongful termination claims under the Act; and (2) the lower courts properly dismissed Plaintiff's remaining claims. View "Lemon v. Williamson County Schools" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the manufacturers of certain equipment (Equipment Defendants) in this product liability action, holding that, on the facts and applicable law, the Equipment Defendants had no duty to warn of the dangers associated with the post-sale integration of asbestos-containing materials manufactured and sold by others.Plaintiffs asserted claims against the Equipment Defendants under the Tennessee Products Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. 29-28-101 through -108, for failing to warn of the dangers of exposure to asbestos-containing products that the Equipment Defendants did not manufacture or sell. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Equipment Defendants. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the Equipment Defendants owed a common law duty to warn about the post-sale integration of asbestos-containing products manufactured and sold by others. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the language of the Act, the Equipment Defendants could not be held liable for injuries resulting from products that they did not make, distribute, or sell. View "Coffman v. Armstrong International, Inc." on Justia Law