Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff James Crowley obtained a judgment in the amount of $14,500 against defendant Wendy Thomas in the general sessions court. Thomas appealed to the circuit court. In the circuit court, Crowley amended his complaint to add his wife as an additional plaintiff and an additional cause of action and to seek additional damages in the amount of $125,000. Shortly before trial, Thomas filed a notice dismissing her appeal. The circuit court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the general sessions court. The Crowleys moved the circuit court to vacate, alter, or amend its dismissal of Thomas's appeal, which the circuit court denied. The Crowleys appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court properly dismissed the defendant's appeal and affirmed the general sessions court judgment. To preserve the plaintiff's original cause of action after such dismissal, the plaintiff must perfect an appeal to the circuit court as prescribed by Tenn. Code Ann. 27-5-108. Affirmed. View "Crowley v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Timmy Sykes and Curtis Greene were employed as criminal investigators by the Chattanooga Housing Authority (CHA) when they expressed their concerns regarding illegal searches and seizures and racial profiling by the CHA chief and assistant chief. Subsequently, CHA terminated the employment of both Sykes and Greene, alleging sexual harassment on the part of Sykes and violations of the CHA cell phone policy on the part of Greene. Sykes and Greene sued the CHA and the CHA chief, alleging retaliatory discharge in violation of the state Whistleblower Act and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA). The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims. The court of appeals vacated summary judgment on the THRA claims and affirmed the trial court's judgment in all other respects. On appeal, the Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the Whistleblower Act claims, finding the undisputed facts established the plaintiffs could not prove an exclusive causal relationship between the plaintiffs' whistleblowing activity and their discharge; and (2) affirmed the appellate court's ruling vacating summary judgment in defendants' favor on the THRA claims, finding there were genuine issues of disputed fact. View "Sykes v. Chattanooga Housing Auth." on Justia Law

In separate trials, petitioner Rudolph Powers was convicted of aggravated rape for an incident occurring in March 1980 and of aggravated rape and robbery by use of a deadly weapon for an incident occurring in May 1980. In 2007, petitioner sought to have a DNA analysis performed on the remaining evidence pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, arguing that he could conclusively establish his innocence if the evidence was uploaded into a DNA database and matched another profile in the system. The post-conviction court denied relief. The court of criminal appeals affirmed, holding that DNA analysis was limited to a comparison between the petitioner's DNA and that collected as part of the evidence in the case. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding the Act permits access to a DNA database if a positive match between the crime scene DNA and a profile contained within the database would create a reasonable probability that a petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained or would have rendered a more favorable verdict or sentence if the results had been previously available. View "Powers v. State" on Justia Law

Terrence Shaw was indicted by a grand jury for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. During the trial, Shaw denied having possession of a gun. The jury convicted Shaw of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor reckless endangerment. At the sentencing hearing the trial court specifically denied Shaw's request for judicial diversion. Shaw appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and the denial of judicial diversion. The Supreme Court held that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction for reckless endangerment, and (2) the trial court considered the necessary factors when considering Shaw's request for judicial diversion and that there was substantial evidence to support the court's denial of judicial diversion. The Court reversed the judgment because of insufficient evidence. Vacated and dismissed. View "State v. Shaw" on Justia Law

Defendant Gary Wade was convicted of aggravated burglary, theft of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000, and theft of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. The trial court classified Wade as a career offender. On appeal, the court of criminal appeals found (1) that the conviction for theft of $1,000 or more but less than $10,000 violated the prohibition against double jeopardy and was therefore dismissed; (2) that, if properly convicted of the remaining offenses, the defendant qualified as a persistent rather than a career offender; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for aggravated burglary and theft of $10,000 or more but less than $60,000. The State appealed. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment of the appellate court with regard to two of the convictions, holding that the evidence presented at trial warrants reinstatement of the convictions for aggravated burglary and theft of property with a value of $10,000 or more but less tan $60,000; and (2) affirmed the appellate court's determination that Wade qualifies as a persistent rather than career offender. Remanded. View "Tennessee v. Sisk" on Justia Law

Two municipalities, Kingston and Harriman, sought to annex the same territory outside the urban growth boundaries for both municipalities set forth in the county's growth plan. Harriman attempted to annex the territory by proposing an amendment to the county growth plan and enacting an ordinance annexing the territory. Kingston then annexed the territory by an annexation referendum. More than a week before the referendum, Harriman filed a complaint in chancery court seeking to hold Kingston's annexation referendum in abeyance while Harriman's annexation proceedings were pending. The chancery court held that Harriman's annexation ordinance was void and created no conflict with Kingston's successful annexation of the same territory by referendum. The court of appeals reversed, and Kingston appealed. The Supreme Court held that Tenn. Code Ann. 6-58-111(d)(1) does not permit a municipality to annex territory outside its urban growth boundary by ordinance. The Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court and reinstated the chancery court's order dismissing the case. View "City of Harriman v. Roane County Election Comm'n, et al." on Justia Law

Evelyn Nye sought compensation for the death of her husband caused by exposure to asbestos at his workplace. The widow sued the company that sold products containing asbestos to her husband's employer, basing her claim on strict liability and alleging the seller failed to warn her husband of the products' health risks. The jury found the seller was at fault but that the husband's employer was the sole cause of his injury. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, holding the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the seller could not be held liable for failure to warn if the jury found that the consumer, identified as the employer, was already aware of danger in connection with the use of the products or if the employer had been given adequate warnings. The instruction was erroneous because (1) it incorrectly applied the learned intermediary doctrine, and (2) it misidentified the consumer as the employer when the consumer who was required to be warned was the employee, Mr. Nye. Because the error more probably than not affected the judgment of the jury, the case was remanded. View "Nye v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Defendant Terry Dominy was charged with three counts of aggravated rape. At trial, defendant was found guilty of the charges. The defendant appealed, arguing that the aggravated rape convictions were invalid due to a statutory exclusion in Tennessee law that precludes a prosecution for rape if the perpetrator is the spouse of the victim. The intermediate court modified defendant's convictions to spousal rape, acknowledging that spousal rape is not a lesser-included offense in the indicted offense. The court of criminal appeals affirmed, holding that the indictment charging aggravated rape was sufficient to support a conviction for spousal rape, a "lesser grade" offense under the supreme court's decision in State v. Trusty. The supreme court held (1) Trusty was overruled to the extent that it recognizes lesser grade offenses as distinct from lesser-included offenses and permits convictions of lesser grade offenses that are not lesser-included offenses embraced by the indictment; and (2) in light of the overruling of Trusty, the defendant's indictment was not sufficient to support a conviction for spousal rape. The court vacated the defendant's convictions, dismissed the indictments and remanded the case to the trial court. View "State v. Dominy" on Justia Law

In 1992, Appellant Wendell Baugh, III acquired Precision Services, Inc. from Ronald and Gayla Miller. The Millers agreed to finance the transaction. Mr. Baugh and his wife personally guaranteed a note executed by the corporation that purchased Precision's assets and the right to use its name. Appellee Herman Novak and his wife were friends and neighbors of the Baughs. In 1995, Messrs. Baugh and Novak bought a company together (Penske Plastics, Inc.), and by contract, were jointly and severally liable for the company's debts and obligations. Both gentlemen agreed to share equally in the company's profits. Mr. Baugh offered to sell one-half of Precision to Mr. Novak. Before he could sell any interest in Precision, Mr. Baugh had to obtain permission from the Millers. Because Mr. Baugh found the Millers difficult to deal with, he asked his attorney to draft an arrangement so that Mr. Novak could purchase an interest in Precision without the Millers' involvement. The document drafted by the attorney included an indemnity agreement by which the Novaks would agree to indemnify the Baughs for fifty percent of any payments they were required to make on the Millers' note and Precision's other debts. Mr. Baugh kept an office at Penske Plastics. Fire destroyed Penske's building in 2003. Of import, a banker-box that contained the original signed copies of the Baugh-Novak 1995 purchase agreement was consumed in the fire. The companies' insurance policies were not enough to cover all the damage caused by the fire. In 2005, Messrs. Baugh and Novak sold Penske Plastics to Alcan Baltec. Up until the time of the closing, Precision's loan obligations were paid from the revenue of Penske Plastics. In late 2005, Mr. Novak sent Mr. Baugh a note essentially "washing his hands" of Precision. In 2006, Mr. Baugh began paying Precision's obligation to the Millers from his personal funds. Mr. Baugh filed suit against the Novaks to enforce the terms of the 1995 agreement, arguing that he was entitled to indemnification and reimbursement for Precision's obligations. The trial court ruled in favor of Mr. Baugh. Mr. Novak appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in several of its evidentiary rulings at trial. The appellate court, on its own motion, reversed the trial court, holding that the purchase agreement and indemnity agreements were contrary to public policy and state law. The Supreme Court found that the evidence did not support the appellate court's holding. The Court reinstated the trial court's decision, and dismissed the Novak's appeal.

In 2004, Plaintiffs Dalton and Sandra Hughes sued the city of Nashville and one of its employees under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA). Mr. Hughes worked for the local fire department. He alleged that Defendant Frank Archey negligently revved the engine to a front-end loader. The loader dropped its bucket to the pavement and made a loud, scraping noise. Mr. Hughes jumped awkwardly over some guardrail to get out of the way of the loader. Mr. Hughes injured both shoulders and both knees in the fall, and ultimately had rotator-cuff surgery and a double knee replacement. Mr. Hughes incurred significant medical bills and missed work. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Mr. Hughes, and the city appealed, arguing that Mr. Archey acted outside the scope of his employment. Furthermore, the city characterized Mr. Archey's act as an "intentional tort", which absolved it from liability under the GTLA. The Supreme Court found that although Mr. Archey's conduct fell within the scope of his employment, his operation of the equipment constituted an intentional tort. The city could not be held liable under the GTLA. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court to enter a judgment against Mr. Archey.