Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, who had purchased a truck from an automobile dealership, filed a products liability suit in 2007 against the manufacturer and the dealership, as Seller. Later, Plaintiff entered a voluntary nonsuit as to Seller and proceeded only against the manufacturer. Over one year later, the manufacturer declared bankruptcy. In 2009, Plaintiff again sued Seller, alleging negligence and strict liability in tort. Seller filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals denied the appeal. The Supreme Court granted Seller's application for permission to consider the application of the saving statute to the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff could proceed under the strict liability claim because that cause of action did not accrue until the manufacturer was judicially declared insolvent; and (2) because the second suit alleged acts of negligence on the part of Seller, an exception to the statutory rule prohibiting products liability suits against sellers, and could have been brought in 2007, the statute of limitations was a bar to recovery under that theory. Remanded for trial. View "Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to theft, and the trial court imposed a three-year sentence in the community corrections program. Defendant violated a condition of his release shortly after September 30, 2003, and the trial court entered an order of revocation, directing Defendant to serve the duration of his sentence in prison and giving credit for time served from the date of his sentence until September 30, 2003. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court should have awarded credit for time served in the program through July 27, 2004, the date the revocation warrant was signed. The court of criminal appeals reversed, holding that the credit should have extended until the issuance of the revocation warrant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the filing date of the revocation warrants begins the tolling of sentence credits. Remanded. View "State v. McNack" on Justia Law

A construction company (Contractor) entered into a contract with the State to restructure an interstate interchange. The contract contained an incentive clause stating that no incentive payment would be made if work was not completed in its entirety by December 15, 2006. After the work was completed, Contractor filed a complaint alleging that the State had breached the contract by refusing to grant an appropriate time extension of the completion date, the disincentive date, and the incentive date. The claims commission (1) found that the contract contained a latent ambiguity requiring extrinsic evidence to interpret the contract, and (2) considered extrinsic evidence in concluding that Contractor was entitled to the maximum incentive payment and an extension of the contract completion date. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the contract was unambiguous and did not permit an extension of the incentive date, and (2) therefore, Contractor was not entitled to an incentive bonus. Remanded. View "Ray Bell Constr. Co. v. State" on Justia Law

During a trial of Plaintiffs' premises liability claim, the trial court excluded as hearsay a portion of the testimony of Defendant's expert. The expert would have testified that he consulted an authoritative source whose interpretation of the applicable building code was consistent with that of the testifying expert. The jury returned a verdict for Plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred because the expert's testimony was admissible pursuant to Tenn. R. Evid. 703, but (2) the trial court's error was harmless. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court, holding (1) the court of appeals improperly applied an amended version of Rule 703 that was not in effect at the time of trial, and (2) the trial court properly excluded as hearsay portions of the proffered testimony of the testifying expert. View "Holder v. Westgate Resorts Ltd. " on Justia Law

The president of a company signed a commercial credit application, which contained language immediately above the signature line stating that the individual signing the contract personally guaranteed amounts owed to the vendor. The company defaulted on the balance of the account, and the vendor filed suit against both the company and the president. The trial court granted summary judgment to the vendor, holding that the president had signed the contract both personally and in a representative capacity. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the president had signed the contract only in a representative capacity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the application contained clear and unambiguous language sufficient to bind the president as an individual guarantor of the contract. View "84 Lumber Co. v. Smith" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Petitioner of premeditated first degree murder and attempted first degree murder and imposed a sentence of death. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Petitioner filed a motion asking the trial court to limit any cross-examination of Petitioner, asserting his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The post-conviction trial court denied the request, and Petitioner did not testify. The court of criminal appeals affirmed, holding that Petitioner's right against self-incrimination applies in the post-conviction context, but a petitioner who elects to testify is bound to answer relevant questions on cross-examination. The Supreme Court declined to decide whether and in what manner the constitutional right against self-incrimination applies in the post-conviction context and instead resolved the appeal on non-constitutional grounds. The Court vacated the trial court and court of criminal appeals, holding (1) the scope of cross-examination of a post-conviction petitioner is governed by Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, 8(C)(1)(d); and (2) the lower courts deprived Petitioner of the limited scope cross-examination provided in Rule 28. Remanded for a new post-conviction hearing. View "Keough v. State" on Justia Law

Employee was allegedly injured during the course and scope of his employment. Employee and Employer unsuccessfully attempted to settle Employee's worker's compensation claim at a Benefit Review Conference (BRC) held on October 11, 2010. An impasse was declared at 10:27:19 a.m. Employee's complaint was filed in the chancery court at 10:27 a.m. Employer's complaint was filed in the chancery court at 10:28 a.m. Employee filed a motion to dismiss Employer's complaint based on the doctrine of prior suit pending. The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's finding that Employee's suit was filed after the impasse report was issued, and therefore, under the doctrine of prior suit pending, Employer's suit was barred. View "Ceildeck Corp. v. Ivey" on Justia Law

Petitioner Henry Felts was convicted of aggravated burglary and attempted murder. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court vacated Petitioner's conviction, finding that trial counsel's representation was ineffective because he (1) failed to pursue the defense of attempted voluntary manslaughter and (2) advised Petitioner not to testify when he had promised the jury that Petitioner would testify. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the courts below erred in finding trial counsel's performance deficient where (1) trial counsel chose a single, reasonable defense theory to the exclusion of another plausible, but inconsistent theory; and (2) trial counsel's decision not to call Petitioner as a witness was consistent with his altered trial strategy. View "Felts v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant contractor entered into a contract to replace a roof. When the newly installed roof developed leaks, Defendant hired an independent contractor to make repairs. While performing the work, the independent contractor caused a fire, resulting in a large insurance claim by the homeowners. As subrogor to the homeowners' rights and claims arising out of the fire, Plaintiff insurance company sued Defendant in tort and contract. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims, finding that because Defendant had subcontracted the work, he could not be liable. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant had an implied non-delegable duty to install the roof in a careful, skillful, diligent, and workmanlike manner. Remanded. View "Fed. Ins. Co. v. Winters " on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation case, Employee was operating a torque gun, which jerked and twisted her right hand while at work. Employee contended that her injury extended into her arm. Employer agreed the injury was compensable but argued that the injury was limited to Employee's index finger. The trial court found that Employee's injury was properly apportioned to her right arm, rather than to her hand or finger, and awarded seventy percent permanent partial disability (PPD) to the right arm. Employer appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by apportioning the injury to the arm and that the award of PPD benefits was excessive. The Supreme Court Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed, holding (1) the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's decision to apportion Employee's injury to the arm; and (2) the evidence supported the trial court's award of disability benefits. View "Majors v. Randstad Inhouse Servs., L.P." on Justia Law