Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this appeal, Defendants sought a review of the trial court's decision to award Plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages based on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of inadequate maintenance of the cemetery where Plaintiff's son was buried. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff had failed to present sufficient proof establishing that she had suffered a serious mental injury, which was a required element of her claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the trial court awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys fees, holding that Plaintiff failed to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress because she provided no evidence that she or anyone else suffered serious mental injuries as a result of Defendants' conduct. View "Rogers v. Louisville Land Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, survivors of a tenant killed by the criminal act of another tenant, filed suit against Defendant housing authority. Plaintiffs alleged Defendant was negligent in failing to evict the other tenant at the first instance of violent behavior. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment claiming federal regulations preempted Plaintiffs' negligence claim and that it was immune from suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (the GLTA). The trial court denied summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) Plaintiffs' negligence suit was not preempted by federal law; and (2) Defendant's failure to evict was an operational decision and Defendant was not entitled to immunity under the GTLA. Remanded. View "Giggers v. Memphis Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

At issue in this consumer protection case was which Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure applied to a motion that sought relief from a default judgment of liability on a counter-complaint, where the motion was filed within thirty days of entry of the default, the trial court did not expressly direct the entry of judgment on the counter-complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, and neither liability on the original complaint nor damages on the counter-complaint were determined. The trial court entered default judgment in favor of the consumer on her counterclaims against Discover Bank and awarded the consumer damages. The court of appeals upheld the default judgment, vacated the award of damages, and remanded the case for a new hearing on damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 54.02, rather than Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, applies in this situation, but the same test applies to motions seeking relief from default judgment, under either rule, on the basis of "excusable neglect"; and (2) actual damages are recoverable for loss of available credit under Tennessee Consumer Protection Act where the plaintiff suffers a demonstrable loss of credit, proximately caused by the defendant, resulting in actual harm. View "Discover Bank v. Morgan " on Justia Law

The City of Jefferson City annexed property on which a fireworks retailer's business was located. The City had an ordinance banning the sale of fireworks within its city limits. The retailer filed suit seeking compensation for a regulatory taking or, in the alternative, for a declaration that Tenn. Code Ann. 13-7-208(b), which allows pre-existing nonconforming businesses to continue to operate despite a "zoning change," permitted it to continue to sell fireworks. The trial court dismissed the retailer's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the City's ordinance banning the sale of fireworks was not a "zoning change" or "zoning restriction" under the test announced in Cherokee Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, the retailer did not qualify for relief under section 13-7-208(b)(1). View "SNPCO, Inc. v. City of Jefferson City" on Justia Law

After an automobile accident between Insured's van and a motorcycle, Insurer filed a declaratory judgment action to determine whether the van was covered under a commercial policy or a personal policy with lower liability limits. Insurer alleged that before the accident Insured had instructed his insurance agent to transfer the van from the commercial policy to the personal policy. Insured denied this and alleged that he had instructed the agent to retain the van on the commercial policy. The trial court ruled that because Insurer had sent Insured a letter and premium bills showing the change in coverage and Insured had paid the bills without objection, Insured had ratified the transfer and the van was covered under the personal policy. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals but on different grounds, holding (1) the action of the insurance agent in transferring the van to the personal policy was not subject to ratification by Insured because the insurance agent was not acting in Insured's stead or for his benefit when it made the transfer; and (2) Insurer was estopped from denying coverage under the commercial policy. View "Allstate Ins. Co. v. Tarrant" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted for burglary, aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping for robbing a restaurant. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to set aside the conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping as violative of due process, relying on State v. Anthony. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced Defendant to an effective twenty-five year term. The court of criminal appeals reversed and dismissed the conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping on due process grounds. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the legislature did not intend for the kidnapping statutes to apply to the removal or confinement of a victim that is essentially incidental to an accompanying felony, such as rape or robbery; (2) this inquiry is a question for the jury after appropriate instructions, which appellate courts review under the sufficiency of the evidence standard as the due process safeguard; (3) Defendant was entitled to a new trial with specific instructions as to the specially aggravated kidnapping charge. Remanded. View "State v. White" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse after killing a thirteen-month-old by deliberately striking the child's head against a wall. The court of criminal appeals determined on its own motion that Defendant's dual convictions violated the double jeopardy protections of the federal and state constitutions. Accordingly, the court merged the reckless homicide conviction into the aggravated child abuse conviction and remanded for resentencing. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the court of criminal appeals' judgment merging the convictions and reinstated the reckless homicide conviction, (1) abandoning the four-factor set forth in State v. Denton; (2) adopting the elements test enunciated in Blockburger v. U.S. as the test for determining whether multiple convictions under different statutes constitute the same offense for purposes of the double jeopardy clause of the Tennessee Constitution; and (3) concluding that reckless homicide and aggravated child abuse are not the same offense because their elements differ, and thus, Defendant's dual convictions did not violate either the federal or the state constitutional double jeopardy prohibition. View "State v. Watkins" on Justia Law

A grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against a motorist (Defendant) that was involved in a high speed chase while attempting to avoid arrest for driving on a revoked license. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of five of the offenses. The court of criminal appeals upheld four of Defendant's convictions but, on its own motion, vacated the remaining conviction after determining that it violated the double jeopardy protections in the federal and state constitutions. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) in accordance with State v. Watkins, released contemporaneously with this opinion, Defendant's convictions did not run afoul of constitutional double jeopardy protections; (2) Defendant's conviction under count one of the indictment must be vacated because the trial court committed plain error in its instruction regarding the lesser-included offenses of that charge; and (3) the evidence supported Defendant's remaining convictions, and the sentences imposed by the trial court were not excessive. Remanded. View "State v. Cross" on Justia Law

Employee, a certified nursing assistant, sustained an injury while working. Six months later, Employee returned to work with significant restrictions on the use of his right arm. After two weeks of training for a different position, Employee resigned. Employee later made a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The trial court held that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work and applied a multiplier of six to the assigned impairment rating. A special workers' compensation panel reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in ruling that Employee had not made a meaningful return to work and reducing the award to one-and-one-half times the impairment rating. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence demonstrated that Employee did have a meaningful return to work. View "Williamson v. Baptist Hosp. of Cocke County, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, charged with first degree premeditated murder and other crimes, entered best interest guilty pleas and received an effective sentence of life without parole. After an unsuccessful petition for post-conviction relief challenging the effectiveness of his trial counsel, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis alleging newly discovered, exculpatory ballistic evidence. The trial court denied the petition, and the court of criminal appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a petitioner who has entered guilty pleas may challenge his convictions by writ of error coram nobis pursuant to the terms of Tenn. Code Ann. 40-26-105(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that while Petitioner did not forfeit the procedural remedy of writ of error coram nobis based on newly discovered evidence by entering the guilty pleas, the evidence in this instance did not qualify as newly discovered. View "Wlodarz v. State" on Justia Law