Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jefferson County enacted a comprehensive zoning ordinance limiting the use of certain property, including Plaintiff's property, to agricultural purposes. Before the passage of the ordinance, Plaintiff undertook various activities designed to establish business operations for its property. When the County issued a stop work order, Plaintiff, without first receiving a decision from the County's board of zoning appeals, filed a declaratory judgment action arguing that the portion of the property not previously subject to zoning qualified as a pre-existing non-conforming use. The trial court (1) concluded Plaintiff was not required to exhaust its administrative remedies, and (2) ruled that the business activities on the property qualified for protection under Tenn. Code Ann. 31-7-208. The court of appeals set the judgment aside, holding that Plaintiff had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the trial court did not err by ruling that Plaintiff was not required to exhaust the administrative remedies; and (2) the evidence did not preponderate against the trial court's finding that Plaintiff had established operations sufficient to qualify for protection under section 13-7-208. View "Ready Mix, USA, LLC v. Jefferson County" on Justia Law

Defendant was sentenced following his conviction on two counts of first degree murder and nine counts of attempted first degree murder. Defendant's attorney subsequently filed a motion requesting a new trial and withdrew as counsel. The motion contained no specific grounds for relief. The trial court appointed replacement counsel. Several months later, replacement counsel amended the motion for new trial to allege specific grounds for relief. The trial court denied the amended motion for new trial. The court of criminal appeals held that the original motion for new trial was a nullity because it contained no grounds for relief and that the trial court therefore did not have jurisdiction to permit the amendment of the motion. The court of criminal appeals therefore considered Defendant's specific grounds for relief as waived. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the original motion for new trial met the requirements of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 33 despite its failure to allege specific grounds for relief and that the trial court retained jurisdiction to permit the amendment of the motion. Remanded. View "State v. Lowe-Kelley" on Justia Law

A patient discovered that a guide wire had been left in her vein during a prior medical procedure. She filed a medical malpractice action against the doctors who performed the procedure and the hospital where the procedure was performed. The patient voluntarily dismissed the medical malpractice suit pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41 when she was informed that another party was responsible for the presence of the guide wire. The doctors named in the original suit filed a malicious prosecution action against the patient. The patient filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the doctors could not prove that the prior suit had been terminated in their favor. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, held that a voluntary nonsuit taken pursuant to Rule 41 is not a favorable termination on the merits for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim. Remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the patient. View "Himmelfarb v. Allain" on Justia Law

An officer stopped Defendant for a traffic violation. When the officer ordered Defendant out of his vehicle to sign the citation, he observed what appeared to be a bag of cocaine on the floorboard of the driver's side. Charged with possession with intent to sell or deliver twenty-six grams or more of cocaine in a school zone, Defendant moved to suppress the evidence as the product of an unlawful seizure. The trial court sustained the motion, concluding that the request to exit the vehicle was not reasonably related to the stop. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the order of suppression and remanded the cause for trial, holding than an officer, after making a lawful stop for a traffic violation, may routinely direct the driver outside of the vehicle. View "State v. Donaldson" on Justia Law

During a robbery, one of the defendants shot the victim in the leg. Although the bullet passed through the victim's leg, the wound required minimal medical treatment and did not cause the victim to suffer a loss of consciousness, extreme pain, disfigurement, or impairment. The defendants were convicted of especially aggravated robbery and aggravated robbery. The court of criminal appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court modified the convictions for especially aggravated robbery to convictions for aggravated robbery because the victim did not suffer a serious bodily injury as required by Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-403. Remanded to the trial court for resentencing. View "State v. Farmer" on Justia Law

Employee was discharged after she filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and a lawsuit against Employer alleging employment discrimination. Employee appealed the termination to the Metro Civil Service Commission (Commission) and eventually settled the appeal, receiving backpay and other consideration in exchange for her agreement not to accept future employment with the agency that discharged her. Employee subsequently filed a complaint against Employer alleging violations of the Civil Rights Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer, reasoning that Employee could not establish her termination constituted an adverse employment action because she had accepted backpay and agreed not to be reinstated as part of the settlement of her Commission appeal. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Employee's acceptance of the settlement did not preclude her from establishing that her termination constituted an adverse employment action for purposes of her federal retaliatory discharge claims. View "Perkins v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County" on Justia Law

Jerry and Martha Garrison witnessed their son's injuries after he was struck by a car. The son died afterwards. The Garrisons filed a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against the owner and driver of the car. The Garrisons also served a copy of the complaint upon their insurance company, State Farm, pursuant to the uninsured motorist provisions of their policy. The policy covered damages for "bodily injury," and "bodily injury" was defined in the policy as "bodily injury to a person and sickness, disease, or death that results from it." The trial court determined that the "bodily injury" provision of the uninsured motorist statute covered mental injuries, and therefore, the policy provided, by operation of law, coverage for the Garrisons' emotional distress claim. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as applied to this case, "bodily injury" did not include damages for emotional harm alone; and (2) the definition of "bodily injury" in the policy did not conflict with the uninsured motorist statute. View "Garrison v. Bickford " on Justia Law

In the workers' compensation case underlying this interlocutory appeal, Employee and Employer were unable to reach a resolution. A benefit review report submitted at 10:25 a.m. on October 20, 2011 memorialized the impasse. On the same day, Employee filed a complaint seeking workers' compensation benefits in the chancery court. The time stamp affixed by the court clerk indicated the complaint was filed at 10:22 a.m. In response to Employee's complaint, Employer filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that Employee's complaint had been filed prematurely. After Employee filed affidavits averring he did not file the complaint until after he received the benefit review repor, the chancery court determined it had subject matter jurisdiction and denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a complaint may not be filed until the time noted on the benefit review report; and (2) when a complaint bears an unambiguous time stamp, it shall be deemed filed t the time indicated, and the time stamp may not be impeached by extrinsic evidence. View "Word v. Metro Air Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

This personal injury suit arose from an automobile accident involving Jeffrey Callicutt and the Manns. The Manns sued Jeffrey's parents (the Callicutts) within the one-year statute of limitations. The Manns amended their complaint to name, as additional defendants, Appellees. Thereafter, Appellees filed dispositive motions in which they contended that the one-year statute of limitations had expired before they were named as parties. The trial court granted Appellees' dispositive motions in a non-final order. Less than one week later, the Callicutts named Appellees as comparative tortfeasors in their amended answer. The Manns named Appellees as additional tortfeasors within ninety days of the Callicutts' amended answer. The Manns subsequently filed a second amended complaint, alleging the same claims against the same defendants. The trial court granted Appellees' dispositive motions attacking the second amended complaint as barred by the one-year statute of limitations. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the dismissal of a defendant pursuant to a written order not made final renders that defendant "not a party to the suit" for purposes of Tenn. Code Ann. 20-1-119; and (2) thus, the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court's dismissal of Appellees from the suit. View "Mann v. Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity" on Justia Law

Employee viewed the bodies of co-workers who had died as a result of work accidents on two separate occasions in February and April 2008. On June 23, 2008, Employee was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) caused by the two incidents. On June 23, 2009, the employee requested a benefit review conference. Employer filed a complaint to determine the amount of workers' compensation benefits due. Employer subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the statute of limitations commenced on the date of the second accident and that the claim was therefore barred. Employee contended that the statute did not begin to run until the date of his diagnosis and that his claim was timely. The trial court granted Employer's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the limitations period did not commence until Employee was diagnosed as having PTSD on June 23, 2008; and (2) the statute of limitations therefore did not bar Employee's claim. View "Gerdau Ameristeel, Inc. v. Ratliff" on Justia Law