Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A group of sergeants employed within the county sheriff's office were paid varying amounts within an established pay range. The sergeants filed a grievance regarding the pay disparities. The sheriff's department civil service board upheld the grievance and ordered the sheriff to equalize the pay of all the sergeants in the sheriff's office. On appeal, the county chancery court declared the board's ruling null and void, holding that the board did not have the authority to order pay equalization. The court of appeals agreed that the board exceeded its statutory authority but remanded the cause to the board so it could direct the sheriff to pay all sergeants the same hourly rate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in the absence of proof that the sheriff violated state law or the sheriff's department civil service manual, the board lacked the power to order salary equalization; and (2) the board exceeded its authority in ordering the sheriff to correct the pay disparity, as there was no proof the sheriff violated state law, and the civil service manual specifically gave the sheriff authority to make individual pay determinations. View "Hammond v. Harvey" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of false imprisonment and assault and sentenced to concurrent sentences of six months. While Defendant's case was pending on appeal, the Supreme Court filed its opinion in State v. White, which requires trial courts to provide a more specific instruction on kidnapping charges as to whether the removal or confinement of a victim is essentially incidental to any accompanying offense. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, holding that although the White instruction was not given at trial, the jury was correctly instructed and the evidence was sufficient to support both convictions. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction for false imprisonment, holding that the omission of the White instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Cecil" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated statutory rape and sentenced to four years incarceration. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the testimony of the victim, a consenting accomplice in the crime, was not adequately corroborated by other proof. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the victim qualified as an accomplice to the crime but that her testimony was sufficiently corroborated by the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the testimony of a victim of statutory rape does not require corroboration; and (2) the evidence presented at trial, including the victim's testimony, was sufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction. View "State v. Collier" on Justia Law

Decedent died following complications that arose when she received anesthesia. Decedent's husband (Plaintiff) filed suit against various health care providers, including Defendant, which contracted with the hospital to provide anesthesia services to its obstetric patients. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant was vicariously liable for the negligent acts of its corporate owner and president, a medical doctor, who was on call the night Decedent received the anesthesia but refused to come to the hospital to administer the anesthesia. Defendant failed to raise the statute of repose as a defense to the vicarious liability claim. After a jury trial, the trial court set aside the verdict for Defendants and granted a new trial. Defendant then moved to amend its answer to assert a repose defense and to dismiss the case based on the statute of repose. The trial court denied Defendant's motions, ruling that Defendant had waived the statute of repose defense. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to timely raise the statute of repose as an affirmative defense. View "Pratcher v. Methodist Healthcare Memphis Hosps." on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested on federal and state charges and taken into federal custody. After a trial in federal court, Defendant was convicted. Defendant was subsequently indicted by a Gibson County grand jury on the related state charges. After he was sentenced in federal court, Defendant was transported to Gibson County for an arraignment. Defendant was arraigned and then transferred back into federal custody. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the state indictment for violations of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), articles III and IV. Under article IV, an official of one jurisdiction may seek custody of a prison serving a term of imprisonment in another jurisdiction, but the prisoner must be tried within 120 days of arrival in that jurisdiction and cannot be shuttled back to the original place of imprisonment before the trial. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea. The court of criminal appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, vacated Defendant's conviction, and dismissed the indictment against Defendant with prejudice, holding that article IV of the IAD was violated when Defendant was transferred back to the federal detention center before being tried for the state charges. View "State v. Springer" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and tampering with physical evidence. The court of criminal appeals upheld Defendant's convictions and sentences. Defendant appealed, arguing (1) the trial court erred in declining his request for a jury instruction on defense of a third person, and (2) his abandonment of the murder weapon did not amount to tampering with physical evidence. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Defendant's conviction for first degree murder, holding that the trial court properly denied Defendant's request for an instruction on defense of a third person; and (2) reversed Defendant's conviction for tampering with physical evidence, holding that Defendant did not "conceal" the murder weapon within the meaning of the relevant statute by tossing the murder weapon over a fence where it could be easily observed and recovered. View "State v. Hawkins" on Justia Law

In this divorce action, the trial court divided the parties' real and personal property, awarded custody of the children to the wife, and declined to award spousal support to the husband. The court of appeals (1) affirmed the trial court's custody determination and, except for the trial court's refusal to divide the wife's post-separation income, upheld the classification and division of the marital estate; but (2) reversed the trial court's judgment regarding spousal support and ordered the wife to to pay the husband transitional alimony in the amount of $2000 per month for thirty-six months. The Supreme Court (1) reversed that portion of the court of appeals' judgment awarding the husband transitional alimony, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award the husband transitional alimony; and (2) affirmed in all other respects the intermediate appellate court's decision.View "Mayfield v. Mayfield " on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and theft of merchandise over five hundred dollars. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to three years on each count to be served concurrently. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred by failing to apply certain mitigating factors and by failing to grant probation or an alternative sentence. The court of criminal appeals, after declining to review the sentences because Defendant had failed to provide a transcript of the hearing on the guilty pleas, affirmed based upon a presumption that the evidence was sufficient to support the sentences. After granting an appeal because of conflicting opinions by the court of criminal appeals as to whether the absence of a transcript of a guilty plea submission hearing precludes appellate review on the merits, the Supreme Court ordered that the record be supplemented. The Court then affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the record was adequate for a meaningful review of the sentences either with or without the transcript of the hearing on the guilty pleas, and Defendant was not entitled to relief. View "State v. Caudle" on Justia Law

A contract required payment of "fee residuals" from customers referred by BSG, LLC to Check Velocity, a company providing check re-presentment services. The contract provided that payment of fee residuals survived the termination of the agreement between the parties and continued until the "expiration of the Customer agreements as they may be renewed." Two agreements were executed between a referred customer and Check Velocity. The first agreement, which expired by its own terms, provided for check re-presentment services. The second agreement continued the re-presentment services required by the first agreement and added additional services. In addition, other terms of the first agreement were changed, including a choice of law provision. The Supreme Court held that the second agreement with additional services and changed terms was not a renewal of the first agreement, thus reversing the court of appeals and affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Check Velocity.View "BSG, LLC v. Check Velocity, Inc." on Justia Law

After the death of the president of the original corporate developer of a residential development, a successor developer purchased the property with the intent to continue to develop it. Homeowners filed suit, alleging the successor developer's new development plan violated restrictive covenants. The court of appeals remanded on the question of whether a general plan of development, or the plat for the subdivision, gave rise to certain implied restrictive covenants. Meanwhile, the homeowners' association amended its charter and the restrictive covenants, which the homeowners challenged. The trial court granted the successor developer summary judgment on all claims in both suits. The court of appeals remanded with directions to determine whether the amendments were reasonable and whether the plat supported the existence of implied restrictive covenants. The successor developer appealed, contending that Tennessee law did not support the court of appeals' reasonableness inquiry and that the plat provided no basis for the existence of implied restrictive covenants. The Supreme Court held that the amendments were properly adopted but found that there was no basis for implied restrictive covenants arising from a general plan of development or from the plat, thus vacating the portion of the court of appeals' judgment remanding the case.View "Hughes v. New Life Dev. Corp." on Justia Law