Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the murder convictions and imposed consecutive sentences of life for the murder and eighteen years for the especially aggravated robbery. As support for consecutive sentencing, the trial court ruled that Defendant qualified as a dangerous offender. The court of criminal appeals remanded to the trial court for a reconsideration of whether the sentences should be served concurrently or consecutively because the trial court had failed to specifically address underlying factors essential to a dangerous offender classification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when a trial court places findings on the record to support its sentencing decision, the applicable standard of appellate review for a challenge to the imposition of consecutive sentences is abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness; and (2) the trial court in this case failed to address the factors required to impose consecutive sentences based on the dangerous offender classification. Remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "State v. Pollard" on Justia Law

Landlords brought an unlawful detainer action against Tenants to regain possession of the premises and recoup damages. The general sessions court later entered a default judgment granting Landlords possession of the property and a $42,500 judgment for past due rent and attorneys' fees. Tenants filed a notice of appeal and posted an appeal bond by depositing $250 cash with the clerk of court. Landlords filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Tenants violated Tenn. Code Ann. 29-18-130(b)(2) by failing to post a bond equal to one year's rent. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that a bond for one year's rent was unnecessary because Tenants had already surrendered possession of the property and vacated the premises. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's denial of Landlords' motion to dismiss, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining that section 29-18-130(b)(2) does not require a tenant who has surrendered possession of the property to post a bond for one year's rent when appealing an adverse judgment of the general sessions court in an unlawful detainer action. View "Johnson v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the minor beneficiary of a $100,000 life insurance policy. Plaintiff filed a complaint against his financial guardian and the insurance company after the guardian misappropriated the insurance proceeds. The trial court entered judgments in favor of Plaintiff. The insurance company appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that, by entrusting the proceeds to the guardian, the insurance company breached its contractual duties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the insurance company acted in good faith when it relied upon the validity of a juvenile court order establishing a financial guardianship in making payment of the life insurance proceeds, and (2) therefore, the insurance company could not be liable for breach of contract. View "Hood v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Jan McCool attempted to get medication at a Wal-mart Super Center, but Wal-Mart employees refused to fill McCool's medical prescriptions because they believed she was intoxicated. McCool became belligerent when her prescriptions were not filled, and the pharmacy employees ordered her out of the store. McCool's vehicle subsequently struck Jolyn Cullum in the Wal-Mart parking lot. Cullum, who had gone to Wal-Mart to shop for groceries, sued Wal-Mart for negligence. The trial judge granted Wal-Mart's motion to dismiss, concluding that Wal-Mart did not have a legal duty to control McCool after she left the store. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Wal-Mart owed Cullum a duty of care to protect her from McCool. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss because (1) the foreseeability of harm and the gravity of harm to Cullum outweighed the burden placed on Wal-Mart to protect Cullum against that harm; and (2) therefore, Cullum's complaint contained sufficient allegations which, taken as true, established that Wal-Mart owed a duty of care to Cullum. Remanded. View "Cullum v. McCool" on Justia Law

The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) issued a permit allowing a limestone quarry to discharge water into Horse Creek. A wildlife sanctuary (sanctuary) filed a petition with the Tennessee Water Quality Control Board (Board) seeking to appeal the permit's issuance and requesting a declaratory order regarding the proper interpretation of the Antidegradation Rule (Rule). After the Board scheduled a contested case hearing, an ALJ dismissed the request for a declaratory order, concluding that Tenn. Code Ann. 69-3-105(i) provided the exclusive to obtain administrative review of TDEC's decision. Rather than pursuing the pending permit appeal, the sanctuary filed a petition in the chancery court seeking a declaratory judgment. The trial court issued a declaratory judgment regarding the proper interpretation and application of the Rule to the discharge permit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 69-3-105(i) disallows parties challenging the issuance of a discharge permit from seeking a declaratory order from the Board regarding the issuance of the permit and requires parties to first exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the issuance of a discharge permit; and (2) the sanctuary failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, and therefore, the trial court should have declined to adjudicate the sanctuary's petition for a declaratory judgment. View "Pickard v. Tenn. Water Quality Control Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against Defendant, a physician. Plaintiff's original complaint was filed prior to the effective date of the pre-suit notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his original action. Plaintiff subsequently filed his action after the effective date of section 29-26-121. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Plaintiff's second action was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff responded that (1) his pre-suit notice commenced his new action prior to the expiration of the one-year saving statute; and (2) alternatively, section 29-26-121 extended the saving statute by 120 days. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's action was commenced by the filing of his second health care liability complaint rather than by providing pre-suit notice; and (2) a plaintiff who files his initial action prior to the effective date of section 29-26-121 dismisses his original action, properly provides pre-suit notice, and refiles his action after the effective date of section 29-26-121 is entitled to the 120-day extension. View "Rajvongs v. Wright" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants in California state court for business-related torts. Plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed his complaint and re-filed his action in the federal district court, alleging several federal securities law violations. The federal court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state-law claims. Thereafter, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his complaint and filed the present action in a Tennessee state court, pleading three of the state-law claims that formed the basis for his two previously dismissed lawsuits. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Plaintiff's claims were barred by Plaintiff's second voluntary dismissal in federal court. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a plaintiff's second voluntary dismissal of supplemental state-law claims filed in federal court does not preclude the plaintiff from later re-filing an action based on the same claims in Tennessee state court. Remanded. View "Cooper v. Glasser" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a healthcare liability suit against several healthcare providers (collectively, Defendants). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on Plaintiff's noncompliance with Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), which requires that a plaintiff's pre-suit notice to a healthcare provider include a HIPAA complaint medical authorization in order to permit the healthcare provider to obtain complete medical records from all other providers that are being sent a notice. The trial court denied Defendants' motion, concluding that Plaintiff's noncompliance with section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) was excused by extraordinary cause. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiff was required to substantially comply with section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), and Plaintiff's failure to comply was not excused by extraordinary cause. View "Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Cmty. Health Care Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a negligence claim against Anderson County for injuries he received during an altercation with another inmate while he was in custody at the Anderson County Detention Facility. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed the staff at the facility was negligent in classifying and housing him and in failing to release him in a timely manner. The trial court (1) found the County was not negligent in its classification or housing of Plaintiff, but (2) breached its duty in failing to timely release Plaintiff. The trial court awarded Plaintiff damages and assessed fifty-five percent of the fault to the County and forty-five percent to Plaintiff. The court of appeals affirmed. In so holding, the court of appeals added its own specific finding that Plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable as a result of being left in a cell with dangerous men an unreasonable amount of time after the release order was given. The Supreme Court reversed in part and vacated the damages award, holding that the County was not liable for failing to release Plaintiff in a timely manner because the injuries he suffered as a result of the delay were not reasonably foreseeable. View "King v. Anderson County" on Justia Law

Upon Mother and Father's divorce, Mother was named the primary residential parent of the parties' two minor children, and Father was awarded visitation. Overall, Mother was allocated 280 days and Father eighty-five days of residential parenting time. Approximately one year later, Father filed a motion to modify the parenting plan, requesting equal time with the children. The trial court concluded that Father satisfied his burden of proving a change of circumstances and modified the residential parenting schedule to provide Mother 222 days and Father 143 days of parenting time with the children. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Father's relocation and remarriage were not material and unanticipated changes that affected the children in any meaningful way. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that, in seeking to modify the residential parenting schedule, Father was not required to prove that his alleged material changes in circumstances were unanticipated when the schedule was originally established. View "Armbrister v. Armbrister" on Justia Law