Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A man and a woman entered into a contract with a surrogate and her husband that provided for the surrogate to be artificially inseminated by the sperm of the intended father. After giving birth, the surrogate was meant to relinquish the child to the biological father and the intended mother. Seventeen days prior to the birth of the child, a juvenile court issued a consent order that declared the paternity of the child, granted custody to the intended parents, and terminated the parental rights of the surrogate. Approximately one week after the surrogate gave birth, she filed a series of motions asking the magistrate to vacate the consent order, set aside the surrogacy contract, and award her custody. The magistrate denied the motions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the juvenile court’s order terminating the parental rights of the surrogate but otherwise affirmed, holding (1) public policy requires compliance with the statutory procedures for the termination of parental rights and does not allow parties to terminate the parental rights of a traditional surrogate through judicial ratification of a traditional surrogacy contract; and (2) in this instance, the contractual provisions circumventing the statutory procedures for the termination of parental rights were unenforceable. Remanded. View "In re Baby" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and related offenses. The trial court imposed a sentence of death based on three aggravating circumstances. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of criminal appeals did not err by affirming the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress statements he gave to law enforcement officers on the basis that the confessions were knowingly and voluntarily made; and (2) Defendant’s death sentence was not imposed arbitrarily, the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and the sentence of death was not disporportionate. Remanded for entry of a corrected judgment reflecting the trial court’s merger of Defendant’s convictions for first degree murder into a single conviction. View "State v. Freeland" on Justia Law

Greg Parker was injured when the shower bench in a hotel where he and his wife were staying collapsed while he was seated on it. The Parkers filed a personal injury suit against Defendant, the owner and operator of the hotel. Defendant raised a comparative fault defense, claiming that D & S Builders, LLC negligently constructed or installed the shower bench. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment after concluding that property owners are generally not liable for an independent contractor’s negligence unless the property owner had actual or constructive notice of it. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that disputes of material fact remained as to whether Defendant had constructive notice of the defective installation of the shower bench. The Supreme Court reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the undisputed facts did not establish any exception to the general rule that property owners are not vicariously liable for the negligence of independent contractors; and (2) the undisputed facts established that Defendant had neither actual nor constructive notice of the defective shower bench installation. View "Parker v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc." on Justia Law

When Mother filed for divorce from Father, the parties’ daughter was living with Mother, and the parties’ son was living with Father. Both parties sought custody of their son. During trial, Mother’s witness was her son’s guidance counselor, who testified by telephone without objection. The trial court divided the martial property, assigned alimony, and designated Mother as primary residential parent for both children. Father appealed. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the trial court erred when it relied on the testimony of the counselor. The Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s custody decision, holding (1) appellate courts should review a trial court’s decision regarding the credibility of a witness who testifies by telephone using the same deferential standard as a live witness; (2) the court of appeals erred by independently weighing the guidance counselor’s testimony by telephone; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assigning Mother as the son’s primary residential parent. View "Kelly v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of Norfolk Southern Railway Company (the Railroad), was injured while pulling a switch while at work. Plaintiff sued the Railroad under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), alleging that the Railroad was negligent because it knew or should have known that the switch was not operating properly. The jury returned a verdict for the Railroad. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court’s instruction to the jury on notice was erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the verdict of the jury, holding that the jury instruction requiring Plaintiff to prove that the Railroad knew or should have known that on the day of the incident the switch was not operating properly qualified as “substantially accurate” in the context of the entire charge, and therefore, a new trial was not warranted. View "Spencer v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. " on Justia Law

While on duty, Dennis Harris, a patrolman with the Anderson County Sheriff’s Department, was struck by a pickup truck driven by Mickey Haynes. Harris received workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries. Harris and his wife (together, Plaintiffs) sued Haynes and Richard Furrow, neither of whom were insured. Plaintiffs also made a claim against Tennessee Risk Management Trust (TRMT), Anderson County’s motor vehicle liability coverage provider, for uninsured motorist coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment for TRMT. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding (1) TRMT was a “risk pool” and not an insurance policy, and therefore, the general statute relating to uninsured motorist coverage in liability insurance policies did not apply to the coverage document issued to Anderson County; and (2) therefore, under the terms of the coverage document, Harris was excluded from uninsured motorist coverage as an employee and a person who received workers’ compensation benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the coverage document TRMT issued to the County specifically excluded employees and those who receive workers’ compensation benefits from uninsured motorist coverage, and because TRMT was not otherwise required to offer such coverage, Plaintiffs could not recover from TRMT. View "Harris v. Haynes" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding (1) the lead prosecutor violated Defendant’s constitutional right against self-incrimination during final closing argument by making a remark that the jury necessarily would have taken to be a comment on Defendant’s exercise of her constitutional right not to testify; (2) the prosecution violated Defendant’s constitutional right to due process by failing to provide to the defense until after the trial the third statement a key witness gave to law enforcement officers investigating the murder; and (3) these constitutional errors were not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Petitioner entered best interest guilty pleas to attempted first degree murder, second degree murder, and especially aggravated robbery. Petitioner later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily made. Petitioner requested that the post-conviction court issue subpoenas for his three co-defendants, who were incarcerated at the time, to testify at the post-conviction hearing. The post-conviction court granted the State’s motion to quash because the defendants were incarcerated. After a subsequent hearing, the post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief. The court of criminal appeals concluded that the post-conviction court erred in refusing to allow Petitioner to present witnesses in support of his claims, but that the error was harmless. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the post-conviction court committed prejudicial error by applying an incorrect legal standard and by overlooking the relationship between the proffered testimony and Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Remanded. View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law

Property Owners filed an action against Montgomery County, asserting a claim of regulatory taking under Tenn. Const. art. I, 21, for which they sought compensation pursuant to the inverse condemnation statute. The County filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed in part and remanded, holding (1) the Property Owners’ regulatory takings claim should be dismissed because the Court had not yet recognized regulatory takings under the state Constitution; but (2) the Property Owners alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for inverse condemnation. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment insofar as it reversed the trial court’s judgment and dismissed the Property Owners’ regulatory taking claim, holding (1) like the Takings Clause of the federal Constitution, Tenn. Const. art. I, 21 encompasses regulatory takings; and (2) the Property Owners’ complaint was sufficient to allege a state constitutional regulatory taking claim, for which they may seek compensation under Tennessee’s inverse condemnation statute. View "Phillips v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

Employee suffered bilateral shoulder injuries and underwent separate surgeries on each shoulder. Employee later agreed to a voluntary buyout of his employment. Employee subsequently filed two separate suits for workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court determined that Employee’s permanent partial disability benefits were not capped at one and one-half times the impairment rating and awarded ninety percent permanent partial disability benefits. Employer appealed. A Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel modified the award of permanent partial disability benefits to 37.5 percent as capped at one and one-half times the impairment rating, concluding that Employee’s decision to accept the buyout was not “reasonable” for purposes of the statutory cap. The Supreme Court reversed in part and reinstated the judgment of the trial court as to the award of ninety percent permanent partial disability benefits, holding that because Employee acted reasonably by accepting the voluntary buyout for reasons related to his work injuries, the award for permanent partial disability was not subject to the one-and-one-half-times multiplier. View "Yang v. Nissan N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law