Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant’s minor daughter was diagnosed with a rare form of cancer and died at the age of fifteen. Defendant was indicted for neglect of a child under the age of eighteen based on her failure to obtain adequate medical treatment for her daughter. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the “spiritual treatment” exemption within the child abuse and neglect statute, which precludes the prosecution of parents who, under certain circumstances, provide treatment through prayer alone in lieu of medical treatment, is unconstitutional. The trial court rejected Defendant’s constitutional claims and denied her motion to dismiss. After a trial, the trial court concluded that Defendant did not qualify for the spiritual treatment exemption and found her guilty of child neglect. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the spiritual treatment exemption is not unconstitutionally vague; and (2) because the exemption may be elided without invalidating the remainder of the child abuse and neglect statute, Defendant’s remaining constitutional challenges would not afford relief. View "State v. Crank" on Justia Law

Employee worked for Employer for thirty-seven years. After his retirement, Employee sought workers’ compensation benefits based upon hearing loss he sustained, especially at frequency levels of sound above 3000 hertz. At issue during trial was the applicability of the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides) to Employee’s hearing loss. The AMA Guides provide an impairment rating formula for hearing loss only up to 3000 hertz but do not rate the level of impairment for hearing losses over 3000 hertz. The trial court awarded a thirty percent vocational disability, not only for the anatomical impairment between 2000 and 3000 hertz but also for the impairment between 3000 and 4000 hertz. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the AMA Guides do not address the effect of hearing loss at levels higher than 3000 hertz, there was evidentiary support for the trial court’s determination that expert testimony established an “appropriate” method for rating the impairment in a manner “used and accepted by the medical community”; and (2) the evidence clearly established a hearing impairment above 3000 hertz. View "Lambdin v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co." on Justia Law

In this health care liability case, Plaintiffs, before filing their health care liability complaint, gave Defendants written notice pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121(a)(1). Plaintiffs subsequently voluntarily dismissed their case. The next year, Plaintiffs filed a new complaint, raising the same claims against the same defendants. Plaintiffs did not give Defendants pre-suit notice before filing the second action. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the notice requirement of section 29-26-121(a)(1). The Court of Appeals reversed, determining that, since the complaints were essentially identical, the statute required only that Defendants be notified once. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the action without prejudice, holding (1) section 29-26-121(a)(1) requires that plaintiffs notify prospective defendants of a forthcoming health care liability lawsuit before the filing of each complaint, and the sanction for failure to comply with the statute is dismissal without prejudice; and (2) Plaintiffs in this case failed to provide the required pre-suit notice. View "Foster v. Chiles" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver within 1,000 feet of a school zone, and other offenses. At the sentencing hearing, Defendant requested that the trial court place her on judicial diversion. The trial court denied Defendant’s request for judicial diversion, reasoning that there was a low likelihood that Defendant would be rehabilitated by judicial diversion. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion, concluding that the trial court failed to consider and weigh on the record all of the relevant factors in denying judicial diversion. The Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s judgments, holding (1) the mandatory minimum service requirement of the Drug-Free School Zone Act does not render offenses under the Act ineligible for judicial diversion; and (2) although the trial court in this case failed adequately to address the appropriate factors on the record, Defendant’s request to be placed on judicial diversion was properly denied. View "State v. Dycus" on Justia Law

Plaintiff contracted to sell Defendants certain real property. The contract provided that Plaintiff would retain ownership of a sixty-foot wide strip of property to provide access to her remaining property, but the warranty deed failed to include the reservation. When it became difficult for Plaintiff to access her property due to improvements on the purchased real property, Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging, among other claims that were subsequently dismissed, breach of contract. The trial court ruled for Plaintiff on the breach of contract claim and awarded her $650,000 in damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the gravamen of Plaintiff’s prevailing claim was injury to real property, and therefore, the claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to “actions for injuries to personal or real property.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s claim was not barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the gravamen of Plaintiff’s prevailing claim was breach of contract, to which the six-year statute of limitations for “actions on contracts not otherwise expressly provided for” applied. View "Benz-Elliott v. Barrett Enters., LP" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Department of Children's Services (DCS) filed a petition to terminate Father’s parental rights to his child. In 2013, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of Father. The court of appeals reversed, holding that DCS was required to make reasonable efforts to assist Father, and reasonable efforts were not made. At issue was whether, in a petition to terminate the parental rights of a biological parent, the State is required to prove that it made reasonable efforts to reunify the parent with the child as a precondition to termination. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals in this case, holding that, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 36-1-113, the State need not prove that it made reasonable efforts as an essential component of its petition to terminate parental rights. In so holding, the Court overruled In re C.M.M. and its progeny to the extent the cases required the State to prove reasonable efforts as an essential component of the termination petition. View "In re Kaliyah S." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first degree premeditated murder for fatally shooting his wife. After Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in direct appeal, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by deciding not to consult an expert to rebut the anticipated testimony of a prosecution expert and by not attempting to introduce a potentially favorable hearsay statement. The post-conviction court denied the petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance from his trial counsel with regard to the issues before the Court on appeal. Remanded. View "Kendrick v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary and other charges. The trial judge did not expressly accept or approve of the jury’s verdict. After Defendant’s trial and before the sentencing hearing, the trial judge left the bench and a successor judge was designated. The designated judge held a sentencing hearing, sentenced Defendant, and transferred the matter to a different division for further proceedings. Defendant moved for a new trial, alleging that a successor judge could not act as the thirteenth juror because witness credibility was the “over-riding issue.” A successor judge conducted the hearing on the motion. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed on the thirteenth juror issue. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstated the judgments of the trial court, holding that the successor judge in this correctly determined that he could perform the function of the thirteenth juror and could independently weigh and assess the evidence adduced at Defendant’s trial so as to prevent a miscarriage of justice by the jury. View "State v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Three patients, who were injured in unrelated motor vehicle accidents, were all treated at the Regional Medical Center at Memphis (Hospital). In each case, either the patient’s insurance company or TennCare paid the Hospital the full amount of the adjusted charges for their case. However, the Hospital refused to release the lien it had perfected under the Tennessee Hospital Lien Act as it awaited recovery from the third-party tortfeasors the full, unadjusted amount of the hospital lien. The patients filed suit. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the hospital could not maintain its lien because each of the patients’ debts had been extinguished. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) except for the unpaid co-pays and deductibles, which are a patient’s responsibility, neither the Act nor the Hospital’s contracts with the patients’ insurance companies authorized the Hospital to maintain its lien after the patients’ insurance company paid the adjusted bill; and (2) one of the patients in this case had not extinguished her debt to the Hospital and was therefore not entitled to have the lien against her extinguished. View "West v. Shelby County Healthcare Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against Defendant, who performed laser surgery on Plaintiff’s eye. Before trial, Defendant filed a motion seeking a waiver of Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-115(b)’s contiguous state requirement, which would allow an ophthalmologist from Florida to testify as an expert witness. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Defendant had not established that appropriate witnesses would otherwise be unavailable. The court of appeals granted Defendant a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 extraordinary appeal and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to waive the contiguous state requirement. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the court of appeals improvidently granted Defendant’s application for extraordinary appeal. View "Gilbert v. Wessels" on Justia Law