Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and false imprisonment. Concluding that the separate convictions for attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault did not violate double jeopardy, the trial court declined to merge any of the convictions and imposed consecutive sentences totaling twenty-six years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences. Defendant appealed, arguing that his sentences for attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault should be merged based upon the former double jeopardy principles set out in State v. Denton. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) due process safeguards do not prohibit the retroactive application of the double jeopardy standard adopted in State v. Watkins, which was decided after the date of Defendant’s offenses; and (2) under Watkins, Defendant was not entitled to relief. View "State v. Feaster" on Justia Law

Buyer purchased a manufactured home from Sellers. The parties entered into a contract setting forth the terms of the sale and the parties obligations. The contract contained an arbitration provision under which Sellers retained the right to seek relief in a judicial forum for limited purposes. Buyer later brought a breach of contract action against Sellers, and Sellers filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion to compel, holding that the non-mutuality remedies in the arbitration provision rendered it unconscionable and invalid. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Sellers’ retention of a judicial forum for limited purposes did not render the arbitration agreement unconscionable. View "Berent v. CMH Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action against Defendants. The trial court granted Plaintiff’s request to voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice after Defendants moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that the certificate of good faith was noncompliant with the requirement of Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-122(d)(4) that a certificate of good faith filed in a medical malpractice action disclose the number of prior violations of the statute by the executing party. Defendants appealed, arguing that the action should have been dismissed with prejudice because Plaintiff did not disclose that there were no prior violations by Plaintiff’s counsel. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 29-26-122(d)(4)’s requirement does not also require disclosure of the absence of any prior violations of the statute. View "Davis ex rel. Davis v. Ibach" on Justia Law

Doctor performed a spinal fusion on Patient. When Patient’s back pain worsened, Patient sued Doctor, alleging that Doctor failed to give him adequate information to enable him to give an informed consent to the surgery. In a pretrial deposition, Patient’s expert testified that to obtain informed consent, Doctor was required to inform Patient about all the potential risks that might arise from the surgery. The trial court granted Doctor’s motion to limit Patient’s expert witness testimony only to those risks that allegedly materialized and injured Patient. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in Doctor’s favor. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of the expert medical testimony. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by excluding expert testimony regarding undisclosed medical risks that had not materialized, and this error, more likely than not, affected the jury’s verdict. Remanded for a new trial on the issue of informed consent. View "White v. Beeks" on Justia Law

Defendants were indicted for aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and especially aggravated kidnapping. A jury convicted Defendants of all charges. The trial court set aside the guilty verdicts for especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated burglary, concluding that these convictions, in conjunction with the aggravated robbery convictions, violated due process principles. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and reinstated the verdicts, finding that separate convictions for each of the offenses did not violate principles of due process or double jeopardy. The Supreme Court remanded to the intermediate appellate court for consideration in light of the Court’s holding in State v. Cecil, which applied the requirement of a jury instruction pursuant to State v. White to cases already in the appellate process on the date White was issued. On remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals reached the same result. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a kidnapping charge accompanied by an aggravated burglary charge does not, standing alone, warrant a White jury instruction; and (2) the trial court erred by not instructing the jury pursuant to the requirements of White with regard to the kidnapping charge as accompanied by the aggravated robbery charge, but the error was harmless. View "State v. Alston" on Justia Law

After a grand jury returned a presentment against Defendant for possession of marijuana, Defendant posted bond and was released. Thereafter, a grand jury issued a nineteen-count presentment against Defendant charging her with multiple crimes, including attempted first degree murder. The State moved to revoke Defendant’s bail. The trial court granted the motion pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 40-11-141(b). The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that section 40-11-141(b) violated Tenn. Const. art. I, 15. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for a bail revocation hearing, holding (1) a defendant has a constitutional right to pretrial release on bail; (2) however, this right is not absolute, and a defendant may forfeit his or her right to bail by subsequent criminal conduct; and (3) before pretrial bail can be revoked, the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. View "State v. Burgins" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of criminal attempt to commit sexual battery by an authority figure. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by including criminal attempt to commit sexual battery by an authority figure in its jury instructions as a lesser-included offense of sexual battery by an authority figure. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err by including a jury instruction for criminal attempt as a lesser-included offense of sexual battery by an authority figure; and (2) the evidence at trial was sufficient for a jury to convict Defendant of criminal attempt to commit sexual battery by an authority figure. View "State v. Thorpe" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated sexual battery. The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence, holding (1) the trial court erred by deviating from the requirements of Tenn. R. Crim. P. 24 during the jury selection process, but that error neither interfered with Defendant’s ability to fully exercise his peremptory challenges nor prejudiced him; and (2) Defendant’s remaining issues were without merit. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction of aggravated sexual battery; but (2) the trial court’s deviations from the prescribed jury selection procedures in Rule 24 prejudiced the judicial process, and therefore, this matter must be remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Frausto" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for driving under the influence and violating the open container law. Defendant moved to suppress all evidence discovered during the search of her car. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that one of the officers who, in response to a dispatch, had detained Defendant unlawfully prolonged the investigatory stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court set aside the order of suppression, holding that the officer had a reasonable basis for extending the stop by ten to fifteen minutes while awaiting the arrival of a second officer, and the duration of the investigatory detention did not exceed the “proper parameters.” Remanded. View "State v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked as a horse groom for Employer. After Employer terminated Plaintiff’s employment, Plaintiff filed a complaint for retaliatory discharge pursuant to both the common law and the Tennessee Public Protection Act, alleging that Employer’s owner had illegally terminated his employment when Plaintiff complained to the owner about the owner’s illegal conduct. The trial court granted Employer’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to state a valid claim for retaliatory discharge because he had not reported the illegal activity to anyone other than the owner. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s claim was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim where the allegations in the complaint established that Plaintiff did not expose Employer’s illegal conduct by reporting it to anyone aside from the person responsible for the conduct. View "Haynes v. Formac Stables, Inc." on Justia Law