Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of facilitation of possession with intent to deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, an offense proscribed by Tenn. Code Ann. 39-17-417. Because the jury found that the facilitation occurred within 1,000 feet of a school, the trial court concluded that the Drug-Free School Zone Act applied, thus increasing Defendant’s felony classification and requiring service of the entire minimum sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that the Act applied to a conviction for facilitation and that there was sufficient evidence to support the facilitation conviction. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the trial court erred in applying the Act to Defendant’s conviction for facilitation by requiring service of the entire minimum sentence and by increasing the felony classification; and (2) the State’s evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt on the lesser-included offense of facilitation of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school. View "State v. Gibson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of nine counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, thirteen counts of observation without consent, and other offenses arising from his hidden-camera videotaping of his twelve-year-old daughter and her teenage friend while they were in various states of undress. Defendant appealed his convictions for especially aggravated sexual exploitation and his sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, concluding that the hidden-camera videos constituted child pornography prohibited under the child sexual exploitation statutes. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Defendant’s convictions for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, holding (1) the use of the six specific factors set forth in United States v. Dost as a “test” or analytical framework in assessing whether material is prohibited under the three child sexual exploitation statutes is hereby rejected; (2) the material at issue must be evaluated based on what is depicted, without reference to the defendant’s subjective intent; and (3) under the correct framework, the videos taken by Defendant do not include a minor engaging in a lascivious exhibition, and therefore, the videos are insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions for especially aggravated child sexual exploitation. View "State v. Whited" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with two counts of vehicular homicide and other crimes arising from a single-vehicle accident that killed two occupants of the vehicle. Defendant filed a motion to suppress any evidence derived from a blood sample obtained from her without a warrant the night of the accident. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant had orally consented to the blood draw. Defendant then filed a second motion to suppress. The trial court granted Defendant’s second motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant had not actually consented to the blood draw and that the police lacked reasonable grounds to believe Defendant was driving under the influence, which was required under the implied consent statute to justify the warrantless blood draw. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the police had probable cause to believe that Defendant was driving while intoxicated at the time of the accident, and thus, the implied consent statute was triggered. View "State v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Defendant drove a car he had rented from Enterprise Rent-A-Car (Enterprise) into Plaintiff’s knee. At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was insured under a policy issued by IDS Property Casualty Insurance Company (IDS), which provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, Defendant’s automobile liability insurer, and Enterprise. Plaintiff also served IDS with a copy of the summons and complaint for the purpose of bringing a claim under his uninsured motorist coverage policy. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of IDS, concluding that the rental car did not qualify as an “uninsured motor vehicle” under the policy. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the rental car was an “uninsured motor vehicle” under the policy. Remanded. View "Martin v. Powers" on Justia Law

A five-count indictment charged Defendant with several felonies and with employment a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. A jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. Defendant appealed, arguing that the indictment for the firearm charge must be dismissed because it did not designate the predicate felony for the firearm charge. The Court of Criminal Appeals (1) reversed the conviction and dismissed the charge of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felon, holding that the indictment on the firearm charge did not meet constitutional requirements; and (2) affirmed the remaining convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) considering the entire indictment, the count of the indictment charging Defendant with employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony was sufficient to meet the constitutional requirement; but (2) the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury on the charge of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Remanded for a new trial on that charge. View "State v. Duncan" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of carjacking and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed on appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress the victim’s identification of him; (2) the trial court did not commit plain error in failing to instruct the jury on possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony as a lesser-included offense of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; (3) the failure to name the predicate felony of the firearm offense does not void that count of the indictment; (4) Defendant’s convictions for carjacking and employment a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony did not violate double jeopardy or the terms of Tenn. Code Ann. 39-17-1324(c); and (5) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. View "State v. Martin" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of four counts of rape of a child, one count of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of aggravated sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of rape of a child. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that aggravated sexual battery is not a lesser-included offense of rape of a child and vacated this conviction on the grounds that the legislature did not include it in the 2009 amendments to Tenn. Code Ann. section 40-18-110. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) aggravated sexual battery is a lesser-included offense of rape of a child; and (2) Defendant’s conviction for aggravated sexual battery as a lesser-included offense of rape of a child was supported by the evidence and should be reinstated. The Court affirmed the remaining issues decided by the Court of Criminal Appeals. View "State v. Howard" on Justia Law

In 2013, William Arnold was convicted in a criminal trial of one count of aggravated sexual battery and three counts of rape of a child for his rape and molestation of John Doe N. In 2011, the child’s mother, Ms. Bowen, filed a civil suit against Arnold, certain Boys and Girls Clubs and certain Big Brothers Big Sisters organizations, alleging that Arnold intentionally molested John Doe N and that the entity defendants were negligent. After the court of criminal appeals affirmed Arnold’s convictions, Bowen filed a motion for partial summary judgment against Arnold, arguing that Arnold was collaterally estopped from relitigating in the civil lawsuit the issue of whether he raped and sexually battered John Doe N. The trial court granted Bowen’s motion for partial summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Court hereby abolishes the mutuality requirement for defense and offensive collateral estoppel in Tennessee and adopts sections 29 and 85 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments; and (2) applying section 85 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments to the facts of this case, the trial court properly granted Bowen partial summary judgment against Arnold on the issue of whether he raped and sexually battered John Doe N. View "Bowen ex rel. Doe “N” v. Arnold" on Justia Law

In 2007, Landlord entered into a written agreement for the lease of commercial real estate to Tenant. In 2009, Landlord filed a complaint against Tenant and Richard Johnson alleging that Tenant breached the lease and that Johnson breached the personal guaranty agreement in the lease. The trial court dismissed Landlord’s claims against Johnson, concluding that Johnson was not personally liable for the obligations in the lease because he did not sign the lease in his personal capacity. At issue on appeal was whether Johnson agreed to be personally liable for Tenant’s obligations when he signed the agreement a second time. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Johnson’s second signature, “which followed a paragraph clearly indicating that the parties agreed that [Johnson] would be personally responsible for [Tenant’s] obligations,” was effective to bind Johnson. Remanded. View "MLG Enters., LLC v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for two counts of statutory rape and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. Defendant applied for pretrial diversion three times, and the district attorney general’s office denied her application each time. Defendant petitioned the trial court for a writ of certiorari after each denial, but the trial court denied each Petition. Upon interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s third denial, the Court of Criminal Appeals ruled in favor of Defendant and remanded with instructions to grant pretrial diversion, concluding that the record did not contain substantial evidence to support the denial of pretrial diversion. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court’s judgment affirming the denial of pretrial diversion, holding that the district attorney general did not abuse his discretion in denying pretrial diversion and that the trial court properly found no abuse of discretion. View "State v. Stephens" on Justia Law