Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this wrongful death case, the court of appeals erred by vacating the trial court’s order and remanding the case for further proceedings without reviewing the correctness of the trial court’s ruling on the decedent’s child’s Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion.The decedent’s mother, in her capacity as her unmarried son’s next of kind, filed this wrongful death suit, seeking damages. The case was settled and dismissed. Almost twenty months later, the decedent’s alleged minor child filed a Rule 60.02 motion to set aside the order of dismissal and to be substituted as the plaintiff. The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that it was not timely filed. The court of appeals vacated the trial court’s ruling, ruling that the Rule 60.02 motion was not ripe for adjudication until the trial court conclusively established the child’s paternity. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the court of appeals erred by focusing on issues surrounding the child’s paternity rather than reviewing the correctness of the trial court’s ruling on the Rule 60.02 motion; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the Rule 60.02 motion was not timely filed. View "Hussey v. Woods" on Justia Law

This legal malpractice action was not barred by the applicable statute of limitations.Defendant attorneys represented Plaintiffs in a lender liability lawsuit. Plaintiffs later filed this lawsuit alleging legal malpractice. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims as barred by the statute of limitations. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court held (1) Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23 (Tenn. 1995), is the proper analysis for determining when a claim of legal malpractice accrues; (2) the complaint in this case failed to establish an actual injury prior to the date of the trial court’s final judgment in the underlying case, and therefore, the trial court erred in determining that Plaintiffs’ legal malpractice claims were time barred; and (3) the trial court erred in granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. View "Story v. Bunstine" on Justia Law

Once funds are withdrawn from a bank account held by a married couple as tenants by the entirety, the funds cease to be entireties property.Husband and Wife in this case deposited funds in a joint checking account designated with a right of survivorship. Husband later withdrew the majority of the funds from the joint account and placed them in a certificate of deposit (COD) issued solely in his name. After Husband died, the trial court concluded that the COD was an asset of Husband’s estate because the funds ceased to be entireties property when withdrawn from the joint account. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the COD belonged to Wife because the funds were impressed with the entireties and could be traced to the joint account. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the COD issued to Husband from funds withdrawn from the joint bank account belonged to Husband’s estate, not to Wife. View "In re Estate of Calvert Hugh Fletcher" on Justia Law

Tennessee’s theft statute, Tenn. Code Ann. 39-14-103, encompasses theft of real property.Defendant physically entered and occupied for one week a vacant house valued at more than two million dollars and filed documents with the county register of deeds office purporting to reflect her ownership of the property. Defendant was convicted of theft of property valued at over $250,000 and aggravated burglary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the theft statute applies to theft of real property by occupation, seizure, and the filing of a deed to the property; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions; and (3) the trial court did not err in limiting Defendant’s cross-examination of a prosecution witness and her closing argument. The court remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. View "State v. Gentry" on Justia Law

Deficiencies in the State’s timely filed notice of intent to sentence Defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as a repeat violent offender did not entitle Defendant to relief via the plain error doctrine.The court of criminal appeals set aside Defendant’s sentence of life without parole and remanded to the trial court for resentencing due to the deficiencies in the State's notice, holding that the document filed by the State did not qualify as notice pursuant to the repeat violent offender statute. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) although the notice was imperfect, it fairly informed Defendant of the State’s intent to seek enhanced sentencing and triggered Defendant’s duty to inquire into the errors and omissions; and (2) Defendant failed to establish that the deficiencies in the notice adversely affected a substantial right - one of the necessary criterion to obtain relief via the plain error doctrine. View "State v. Patterson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered a question certified to it by a federal court regarding whether a repairman’s lien arising under Tenn. Code Ann. 66-19-101 may be enforced by a method other than attachment of the lien-subject property itself. Here, the lien-subject property was sold to a purchaser and was no longer available for attachment during the pendency of the federal court action, so the lien holder sought to reach the proceeds from the sale of the lien-subject property. The Supreme Court answered by holding that Tenn. Code Ann. 66-21-101, which addresses enforcement of a statutory lien by original attachment where the lien statute does not specify a method to enforce the lien, is not a statutory vehicle for the lien holder to reach the proceeds from the sale of the lien-subject property and neither provides for nor excludes other remedies that may be available to the lien holder to reach the proceeds from the sale of the lien-subject property. View "Embraer Aircraft Maintenance Services, Inc. v. Aerocentury Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the general rule that to establish standing a contestant must show that he or she would be entitled to share in the decedent’s estate if the will were set aside or if no will existed.In this case the contestants to a will were five of the decedent’s seven children. The contestants were disinherited by a will dated October 1, 2013 and by a prior will dated October 11, 2012. The trial court dismissed the will contest for lack of standing based on two prior decisions of the Supreme Court. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the cases cited in the courts below did not announce a broad, bright-line rule that persons disinherited by facially valid successive wills lack standing. The court went on to hold that the contestants satisfied the general standing requirement long recognized in Tennessee by showing that they would share in the decedent’s estate under the laws of intestacy and under prior wills. View "In re Estate of J. Don Brock" on Justia Law

Father’s appeal in this termination of parental rights case satisfied the signature requirement contained in Tenn. Code Ann. 36-1-124(d) and was not subject to dismissal.Father timely a timely notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court terminating his parental rights. The notice of appeal was signed by Father’s attorney but not signed personally by Father.The court of appeals entered an order directing Father to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction for failure to comply with section 36-1-124(d). Father’s response included a challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. The Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction over the case and, after directing the parties and the attorney general to address certain issues, held (1) section 36-1-124(d) does not require a notice of appeal to be signed personally by the appellant; and (2) because the notice of appeal signed by Father’s attorney satisfied the signature requirement, Father’s appeal was not subject to dismissal, thus rendering moot the other issues before the court. View "In re Bentley D." on Justia Law

The legislature intended the phrase “not engaged in unlawful activity” in the self-defense statute, Tenn. Code Ann. 39-11-611, to be a condition of the statutory privilege not to retreat when confronted with unlawful force, and the trial court should make the threshold determination of whether the defendant was engaged in unlawful activity when he used force in an alleged self-defense situation.Defendant was convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of attempted second degree murder and related offenses. The court of criminal appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s conduct of being a felon in possession of a firearm was unlawful activity for purposes of the self-defense statute, but the trial court’s jury instructions were harmless error; and (2) Defendant’s remaining arguments on appeal were without merit. View "State v. Perrier" on Justia Law

At issue was whether a home inspector owes a duty of reasonable care to a homeowner’s guest.Plaintiff was injured when he fell from a second story deck that had not been properly constructed but had recently been inspected by a state home inspector hired by the homeowner. Plaintiff sued the home inspector, home inspection franchise, and other defendants not relevant to this appeal. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendants successfully negated essential elements of the claims of negligent misrepresentation and negligent inspection and that summary judgment was appropriate. View "Grogan v. Uggla" on Justia Law