Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court accepted a question of law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and concluded that a defendant convicted of first-degree murder committed on or after July 1, 1995 and sentenced to life in prison under Tenn. Code Ann. 39-13-202(c)(3) may be released, at the earliest, after fifty-one years of imprisonment.The certified question in this case concerned the interpretation and application of the Tennessee sentencing statutes governing release eligibility of criminal defendants under Tenn. Code Ann. 40-35-501(h) and (i). After analyzing the statutes, the Supreme Court held that a defendant convicted of first-degree murder that occurred on or after July 1, 1995 may be released after service of at least fifty-one years if the defendant earns the maximum allowable sentence reduction credits. View "Brown v. Jordan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault but modified his sentence, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction but the trial court erred in sentencing Defendant to enhanced punishment because Defendant did not receive proper notice of the State’s intention to seek enhanced sentencing.Defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced as a career offender. Defendant unsuccessfully objected to his classification as a career offender based on the State’s failure to file a pre-trial notice of intent to seek enhanced punishment. In its oral sentencing findings, the trial court noted that Defendant had the requisite prior convictions to qualify as a career offender and that, in a prior case, the State had filed a proper notice. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the sentence and remanded for entry of a corrected judgment, holding (1) a new enhancement notice must be filed in a separate case that is wholly unrelated to a prior case in which the State provides such notice; and (2) having received no properly filed notice of the State’s intent to seek enhanced punishment, Defendant was entitled to relief. View "State v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing death-sentenced inmates’ challenge to Tennessee’s current three-drug lethal injection protocol, holding that the inmates failed to establish that the three-drug protocol constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or article I, section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution.This appeal was the third time the Supreme Court addressed the facial constitutionality of Tennessee’s lethal injection protocol. In the first two appeals the Court upheld the particular protocol in question. At issue in the instant appeal was Tennessee’s current three-drug protocol. The trial court dismissed the inmates’ complaint for declaratory judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the inmates failed to establish that the three-drug protocol constitutes cruel and unusual punishment; and (2) the majority of the other issues raised by the inmates on appeal were rendered moot, and the inmates were not entitled to relief on their remaining issues. View "Abdur'Rahman v. Parker" on Justia Law

The question these consolidated cases presented for the Tennessee Supreme Court's review centered on whether the trial court erred in suppressing evidence seized from the defendants’ residences in the 19th Judicial District because the warrants were signed by a Judge of the 23rd Judicial District. The Court held that, in the absence of interchange, designation, appointment, or other lawful means, a circuit court judge in Tennessee lacks jurisdiction to issue search warrants for property located outside the judge’s statutorily assigned judicial district. Nothing in the record on appeal established the 23rd Judicial District Circuit Court Judge obtained jurisdiction to issue search warrants for property in the 19th Judicial District. As a result, the searches were constitutionally invalid. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, which upheld the trial court’s order granting the defendants’ motions to suppress was affirmed. View "Tennessee v. Frazier" on Justia Law

In this case challenging the constitutionality of Tenn. Code Ann. 55-10-413(f), the Supreme Court held that the Defendant’s constitutional challenges failed.The statutory scheme at issue here imposes a fee upon persons convicted of certain drug and alcohol offenses when Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) forensic scientists have conducted chemical tests to determine blood alcohol or drug content. The statute earmarks the fees imposed to an intoxicant testing fund, and monies in the fund remain available for appropriation to the TBI as determined by the General Assembly. Defendant argued that the statutory scheme provides TBI forensic scientists with financial incentives to produce blood alcohol test results that result in convictions, which increases fees and funding for the TBI. Therefore, Defendant argued, the financial incentives create an appearance of impropriety and deprive of her her constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial. The Supreme Court held (1) the standard of neutrality announced in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), and its progeny does not apply to TBI forensic scientists; (2) even if the Tumey standards applied, Defendant’s constitutional claim failed because there is no appearance of impropriety; and (3) the statute does not violate substantive due process. View "State v. Decosimo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act (ERRA), Tenn. Code Ann. 40-6-108, represents an impermissible encroachment by the legislature upon the Supreme Court’s authority and responsibility to adopt exceptions to the exclusionary rule and therefore violates the Tennessee Constitution’s Separation of Powers Clause.Defendant was convicted to two counts of first degree premeditated murder and other crimes. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) in light of today’s holding that the ERRA is unconstitutional, the trial court erred when it denied Defendant’s motion to suppress in reliance on the ERRA; (2) a good-faith clerical error that results in an inconsequential variation between three copies of a search warrant required pursuant to Rule 41, in and of itself, does not entitle the moving party to suppression of the evidence collected pursuant to the warrant, and therefore, the trial court properly denied Defendant’s motion to suppress under this good-faith exception; and (3) Defendant’s remaining arguments on appeal did not warrant reversal of her convictions. View "State v. Lowe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendant’s motion to suppress a blood sample drawn from Defendant pursuant to a search warrant because the arresting officer failed to leave a copy of the warrant with Defendant, holding that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, a good-faith exception should be applied to Tenn. R. Crim. P. 41’s exclusionary rule.The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant on the basis of the exclusionary rule set out in Rule 41. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this matter to the trial court for further proceedings, holding that, given the specific facts of this case, a good-faith exception to Rule 41’s technical requirement that the officer executing a search warrant leave a copy of the warrant with the person searched should apply to this case. View "State v. Daniel" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a Brady claim is cognizable in the context of a petition for writ of error coram nobis and whether Appellant’s petition for a writ of error coram nobis should be dismissed as time-barred even though the State was not brought into the coram nobis proceedings at the trial court level and, consequently, did not assert the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in the trial court. Appellant filed a coram nobis petition alleging that the State committed a Brady violation. The trial court dismissed Appellant’s petition in part because it was filed after expiration of the statute of limitations. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed because the petition did not present newly discovered evidence warranting coram nobis relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an error coram nobis proceeding is not the appropriate procedural vehicle for obtaining relief from an alleged Brady violation; (2) timeliness under the statute of limitations is an essential element of a coram nobis claim that must be demonstrated on the face of the petition; (3) the facts supporting an equitable tolling request must likewise appear on the face of the petition; and (4) the trial court did not err in dismissing the coram nobis petition in this case. View "Nunley v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the chancery court reversing the decision of a hearing panel denying Attorney’s petition to be reinstated to the practice of law in Tennessee following his disbarment and ordering Attorney reinstated, holding that the chancery court misapplied the applicable standard of review.In 2007, Attorney pleaded guilty to federal charges of receipt and possession of images depicting child pornography. In 2008, Attorney consented to his disbarment. In 2014, after he was discharged from prison and while on probation, Attorney petitioned to be reinstated to the practice of law. The Board of Professional Responsibility opposed the petition. The Supreme Court held that substantial and material proof supported the panel’s conclusion that Attorney had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence his moral qualifications for reinstatement, and that the chancery court impermissibly reweighed the evidence in the record before it. View "Smith v. Board of Professional Responsibility" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s claim brought against Defendant pursuant to the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C. 4301 to 4335 (USERRA), accrued prior to July 1, 2014 and remained barred by sovereign immunity.In 2014, the General Assembly enacted a statute waiving Tennessee’s sovereign immunity for claims bought against the State pursuant to USERRA. The waiver of sovereign immunity became effective on July 1, 2014 and applied to USERRA claims accusing on or after that date. Relying on this newly enacted statute, Plaintiff brought a USERRA claim against Defendant, an entity of the State, based on facts that occurred prior to August 8, 2014. the trial court dismissed the claim, concluding that the claim remained barred by sovereign immunity because it accrued prior to July 1, 2014. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued on July 1, 2014 when Plaintiff gained a judicial remedy by the enactment of the statute waiving sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s claim accrued prior to July 1, 2014. View "Smith v. Tennessee National Guard" on Justia Law