Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1992, Appellant Wendell Baugh, III acquired Precision Services, Inc. from Ronald and Gayla Miller. The Millers agreed to finance the transaction. Mr. Baugh and his wife personally guaranteed a note executed by the corporation that purchased Precision's assets and the right to use its name. Appellee Herman Novak and his wife were friends and neighbors of the Baughs. In 1995, Messrs. Baugh and Novak bought a company together (Penske Plastics, Inc.), and by contract, were jointly and severally liable for the company's debts and obligations. Both gentlemen agreed to share equally in the company's profits. Mr. Baugh offered to sell one-half of Precision to Mr. Novak. Before he could sell any interest in Precision, Mr. Baugh had to obtain permission from the Millers. Because Mr. Baugh found the Millers difficult to deal with, he asked his attorney to draft an arrangement so that Mr. Novak could purchase an interest in Precision without the Millers' involvement. The document drafted by the attorney included an indemnity agreement by which the Novaks would agree to indemnify the Baughs for fifty percent of any payments they were required to make on the Millers' note and Precision's other debts. Mr. Baugh kept an office at Penske Plastics. Fire destroyed Penske's building in 2003. Of import, a banker-box that contained the original signed copies of the Baugh-Novak 1995 purchase agreement was consumed in the fire. The companies' insurance policies were not enough to cover all the damage caused by the fire. In 2005, Messrs. Baugh and Novak sold Penske Plastics to Alcan Baltec. Up until the time of the closing, Precision's loan obligations were paid from the revenue of Penske Plastics. In late 2005, Mr. Novak sent Mr. Baugh a note essentially "washing his hands" of Precision. In 2006, Mr. Baugh began paying Precision's obligation to the Millers from his personal funds. Mr. Baugh filed suit against the Novaks to enforce the terms of the 1995 agreement, arguing that he was entitled to indemnification and reimbursement for Precision's obligations. The trial court ruled in favor of Mr. Baugh. Mr. Novak appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in several of its evidentiary rulings at trial. The appellate court, on its own motion, reversed the trial court, holding that the purchase agreement and indemnity agreements were contrary to public policy and state law. The Supreme Court found that the evidence did not support the appellate court's holding. The Court reinstated the trial court's decision, and dismissed the Novak's appeal.

In 2004, Plaintiffs Dalton and Sandra Hughes sued the city of Nashville and one of its employees under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA). Mr. Hughes worked for the local fire department. He alleged that Defendant Frank Archey negligently revved the engine to a front-end loader. The loader dropped its bucket to the pavement and made a loud, scraping noise. Mr. Hughes jumped awkwardly over some guardrail to get out of the way of the loader. Mr. Hughes injured both shoulders and both knees in the fall, and ultimately had rotator-cuff surgery and a double knee replacement. Mr. Hughes incurred significant medical bills and missed work. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Mr. Hughes, and the city appealed, arguing that Mr. Archey acted outside the scope of his employment. Furthermore, the city characterized Mr. Archey's act as an "intentional tort", which absolved it from liability under the GTLA. The Supreme Court found that although Mr. Archey's conduct fell within the scope of his employment, his operation of the equipment constituted an intentional tort. The city could not be held liable under the GTLA. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court to enter a judgment against Mr. Archey.

Defendant Cedric Johnson was charged with committing an aggravated robbery and was separately charged with initiating a false police report. Within one month of being indicted for initiating a false police report, Defendant pled guilty to the offense. The trial record revealed that Defendant's car was used in the robbery, and in order to thwart discovery by the police, Defendant reported the car as stolen. The grand jury indicted Defendant for aggravated robbery. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the robbery indictment, arguing that he had already been prosecuted for filing the false report in connection with the robbery. The trial court granted Defendant's motion, and the State appealed. The issue before the Supreme Court pertained to offenses arising from the same criminal episode. In the Defendant's case, the Court found that the two offenses were not part of the same episode, and therefore, the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's dismissal of the robbery charge. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.