Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When homeowners’ partially completed house and its contents were destroyed by fire, the homeowners sued the general contractor and the flooring subcontractors for damages, alleging that the fire was caused by the negligence of the general contractor and the subcontractors and that the general contractor had breached the construction contract. The trial court granted summary judgment to the general contractor and to the subcontractors. The court of appeals (1) affirmed summary judgment to the general contractor based on the inapplicability of res ipsa loquitur to establish an inference of negligence; and (2) reversed summary judgment to the subcontractors on the negligence claim and to the general contractor on the breach of contract claim, concluding that there remained genuine issues of disputed material fact. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, holding (1) Plaintiffs could not rely on res ipsa loquitur because of insufficient proof that the general contractor had exclusive control of the cause or all reasonably probable causes of the fire; and (2) Plaintiffs did not produce sufficient evidence to establish that any negligence of the subcontractors was the cause in fact of the fire. View "Jenkins v. Big City Remodeling" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the secretarial assistant of Circuit Judge Harold Wimberly when Judge Wimberly lost the contested general election to William Ailor. Ailor informed Plaintiff that he would not require her services after taking office. Plaintiff filed suit against the State and Ailor in his individual capacity, alleging tortious interference with her employment relationship. Plaintiff also filed a complaint in the Claims Commission. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the statute providing that claims against the State based on the acts or omissions of state employees shall operate as a waiver of any cause of action which the claimant has against any state officer or employee. The trial court declined to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Ailor, concluding that Ailor was not acting as a state officer or employee when he made the administrative staffing decision. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Plaintiff’s employment automatically ended when Judge Wimberly’s term ended and because she remained employed until the end of Judge Wimberly’s term, as a matter of law, Ailor did not tortiously interfere with Plaintiff’s employment relationship. View "Moore-Pennoyer v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s husband collapsed and died after participating in an exercise class at a fitness facility owned and operated by Church. Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against Church alleging that Church negligently failed to utilize the automated external defibrillator (AED) on site that the facility, to train facility personnel on the proper use of the AED, and to comply with applicable state statutes. Church filed a third-party complaint against the company that sold it the AED (Seller), alleging that, should Plaintiff recover a judgment against it for failing to comply with statutes, Seller should be solely responsible for the judgment. Plaintiff then filed a second complaint naming Seller as a defendant. Seller moved for summary judgment against Plaintiff and Church, arguing that it owed no duty of care to Plaintiff or her husband. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Seller did not owe a duty of care to Plaintiff’s husband or other users of the fitness facility independent of its contract with Church; and (2) Church had no duty to acquire or use the AED it purchased from Seller, and therefore, Plaintiff’s husband was not a third-party beneficiary of Church’s contract with Seller. Remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of Seller. View "Wallis v. Brainerd Baptist Church" on Justia Law

Defendant drove a car he had rented from Enterprise Rent-A-Car (Enterprise) into Plaintiff’s knee. At the time of the incident, Plaintiff was insured under a policy issued by IDS Property Casualty Insurance Company (IDS), which provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, Defendant’s automobile liability insurer, and Enterprise. Plaintiff also served IDS with a copy of the summons and complaint for the purpose of bringing a claim under his uninsured motorist coverage policy. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of IDS, concluding that the rental car did not qualify as an “uninsured motor vehicle” under the policy. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the rental car was an “uninsured motor vehicle” under the policy. Remanded. View "Martin v. Powers" on Justia Law