Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

While Alicia Howell worked on an assembly production line at Nissan North America, she was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. After surgery, Howell and Nissan settled Howell's workers' compensation claim for her carpal tunnel injuries. When Howell attempted to return to work, she was told she would be returning to the fast-paced assembly line. Howell resigned and was hired at minimum wage for a temporary staffing agency. Howell then filed a petition for reconsideration of her earlier settlement. The trial court held that Howell was eligible for reconsideration of her workers' compensation benefits because she did not have a meaningful return to work and awarded her a twenty-five percent permanent partial disability rating to each upper extremity. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appeals panel and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the appeals panel erred in holding that Howell had a meaningful return to work and her decision to resign rather than returning to work was unreasonable, and (2) the trial court's award was not excessive. View "Howell v. Nissan N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Employee injured his shoulder while working for Employer. After Employee returned to work, he filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. Employee and Employer settled Employee's claim. The settlement stated that the award of vocational disability benefits to which the parties agreed was not based on the medical impairment rating of either the treating physician or Employee's independent medical examiner. After Employee was laid off, he sought reconsideration of his benefits. The chancery court awarded additional permanent disability benefits based on an impairment rating computed from the percentage of permanent partial disability reflected in the settlement. Employer appealed. At issue was whether the chancery court erred in declining to apply any of three impairment ratings assigned by physicians after the original settlement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a court's reconsideration of a workers' compensation award is limited to a determination of additional permanent partial disability based on the employee's impairment rating at the time of the initial award or settlement, and therefore, the chancery court properly computed the medical impairment rating; and (2) the award was not excessive. View "Lazar v. J.W. Aluminum" on Justia Law

After Pam Webb, who was employed by the Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, was fired, Webb filed a complaint alleging retaliatory discharge. Habitat filed a motion to dismiss Webb's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6). Webb filed an amended complaint, and Habitat responded by filing an amended Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss. The trial court granted Habitat's motion and dismissed the amended complaint on all claims. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's judgment, holding that the amended complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. The Supreme Court granted review. At issue was the proper standard for Tennessee courts to apply in ruling on a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss and whether the Court should adopt the pleading standard set forth in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, which retired the notice pleading regime recognized in Conley v. Gibson in favor of a new plausibility pleading standard. The Supreme Court declined to adopt the new Twombly/Iqbal plausibility pleading standard and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc." on Justia Law

Employee injured her right shoulder in the course of her employment with Employer. Employee received medical treatment, during which time she continued to work for Employer. Employee filed a complaint in chancery court seeking workers' compensation benefits from her Employer. At trial, the parties contested the extent of Employee's anatomical impairment and permanent disability. The medical evidence at trial consisted of the testimony of two physicians, and through their testimony, the parties introduced Employee's medical records generated by other treating physicians. The physicians assigned varying degrees of impairment to the body as whole. The trial court eventually chose the evaluating physician's impairment, who assigned a seventeen percent impairment, and awarded Employee 25.5 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. Employer appealed, arguing that the evaluating physician's rating did not comply with the American Medical Association Guides and that the award was therefore excessive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by accepting the evaluating physician's impairment rating as the basis of the disability award. View "Morris v. Jackson Clinic Prof'l Assoc." on Justia Law

After Employee sustained an injury, he filed a worker's compensation action against Employer. The result was a court-approved workers' compensation settlement. Employee's authorized treating physician later recommended medical treatment. After Employer's utilization review provider denied approval of the proposed treatment, Employer filed a motion for an independent medical examination, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 50-6-204(d)(1), which is required if reasonable. The trial court found Employer's request to be unreasonable and denied the motion. On appeal, the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) Employer had good faith reasonable basis for questioning both the causation and the necessity of the proposed treatment and for filing a motion for a physical examination of Employee; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Employer's request for a medical examination of Employee was unreasonable. Remanded. View "Irons v. K & K Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Timmy Sykes and Curtis Greene were employed as criminal investigators by the Chattanooga Housing Authority (CHA) when they expressed their concerns regarding illegal searches and seizures and racial profiling by the CHA chief and assistant chief. Subsequently, CHA terminated the employment of both Sykes and Greene, alleging sexual harassment on the part of Sykes and violations of the CHA cell phone policy on the part of Greene. Sykes and Greene sued the CHA and the CHA chief, alleging retaliatory discharge in violation of the state Whistleblower Act and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA). The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims. The court of appeals vacated summary judgment on the THRA claims and affirmed the trial court's judgment in all other respects. On appeal, the Supreme Court (1) affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the Whistleblower Act claims, finding the undisputed facts established the plaintiffs could not prove an exclusive causal relationship between the plaintiffs' whistleblowing activity and their discharge; and (2) affirmed the appellate court's ruling vacating summary judgment in defendants' favor on the THRA claims, finding there were genuine issues of disputed fact. View "Sykes v. Chattanooga Housing Auth." on Justia Law

In 2004, Plaintiffs Dalton and Sandra Hughes sued the city of Nashville and one of its employees under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA). Mr. Hughes worked for the local fire department. He alleged that Defendant Frank Archey negligently revved the engine to a front-end loader. The loader dropped its bucket to the pavement and made a loud, scraping noise. Mr. Hughes jumped awkwardly over some guardrail to get out of the way of the loader. Mr. Hughes injured both shoulders and both knees in the fall, and ultimately had rotator-cuff surgery and a double knee replacement. Mr. Hughes incurred significant medical bills and missed work. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Mr. Hughes, and the city appealed, arguing that Mr. Archey acted outside the scope of his employment. Furthermore, the city characterized Mr. Archey's act as an "intentional tort", which absolved it from liability under the GTLA. The Supreme Court found that although Mr. Archey's conduct fell within the scope of his employment, his operation of the equipment constituted an intentional tort. The city could not be held liable under the GTLA. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court to enter a judgment against Mr. Archey.