Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Employee worked for Employer for thirty-seven years. After his retirement, Employee sought workers’ compensation benefits based upon hearing loss he sustained, especially at frequency levels of sound above 3000 hertz. At issue during trial was the applicability of the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides) to Employee’s hearing loss. The AMA Guides provide an impairment rating formula for hearing loss only up to 3000 hertz but do not rate the level of impairment for hearing losses over 3000 hertz. The trial court awarded a thirty percent vocational disability, not only for the anatomical impairment between 2000 and 3000 hertz but also for the impairment between 3000 and 4000 hertz. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the AMA Guides do not address the effect of hearing loss at levels higher than 3000 hertz, there was evidentiary support for the trial court’s determination that expert testimony established an “appropriate” method for rating the impairment in a manner “used and accepted by the medical community”; and (2) the evidence clearly established a hearing impairment above 3000 hertz. View "Lambdin v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was discharged from his position of Chief of Police for the City of Red Bank, he filed suit in the Chancery Court against the City, alleging statutory retaliatory discharge in violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act (TPPA) and age discrimination in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA). The Chancery Court (1) granted the City’s request to transfer the case to the Circuit Court; (2) granted the City’s request to proceed without a jury on the TPPA claim, citing Young v. Davis, which held that the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA) controls TPPA claims against governmental entities, and such claims must be tried without a jury in the manner prescribed by the GTLA; but (3) upheld Plaintiff’s request for a jury on his THRA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the GLTA applies to claims brought against a municipality pursuant to the THRA, and therefore, Plaintiff’s THRA claim was required to be tried without the intervention of a jury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the GTLA did not govern Plaintiff’s THRA claim and that the Legislature has afforded a statutory right to trial by jury on THRA claims filed against governmental entities in chancery court. View "Sneed v. City of Red Bank" on Justia Law

A jury awarded $3 million in compensatory damages to Plaintiff after finding that Defendant, Plaintiff's employer, retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiff failed to show that his supervisor knew of his protected activity before she took adverse action against him. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals, reinstated the jury verdict, and remanded, holding that the jury’s verdict was supported by material evidence from which the jury could infer that the supervisor knew that Plaintiff had filed a discrimination lawsuit when she engaged in retaliatory conduct against Plaintiff. View "Ferguson v. Middle Tenn. State Univ." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of Norfolk Southern Railway Company (the Railroad), was injured while pulling a switch while at work. Plaintiff sued the Railroad under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA), alleging that the Railroad was negligent because it knew or should have known that the switch was not operating properly. The jury returned a verdict for the Railroad. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court’s instruction to the jury on notice was erroneous. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the verdict of the jury, holding that the jury instruction requiring Plaintiff to prove that the Railroad knew or should have known that on the day of the incident the switch was not operating properly qualified as “substantially accurate” in the context of the entire charge, and therefore, a new trial was not warranted. View "Spencer v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. " on Justia Law

While on duty, Dennis Harris, a patrolman with the Anderson County Sheriff’s Department, was struck by a pickup truck driven by Mickey Haynes. Harris received workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries. Harris and his wife (together, Plaintiffs) sued Haynes and Richard Furrow, neither of whom were insured. Plaintiffs also made a claim against Tennessee Risk Management Trust (TRMT), Anderson County’s motor vehicle liability coverage provider, for uninsured motorist coverage. The trial court granted summary judgment for TRMT. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding (1) TRMT was a “risk pool” and not an insurance policy, and therefore, the general statute relating to uninsured motorist coverage in liability insurance policies did not apply to the coverage document issued to Anderson County; and (2) therefore, under the terms of the coverage document, Harris was excluded from uninsured motorist coverage as an employee and a person who received workers’ compensation benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the coverage document TRMT issued to the County specifically excluded employees and those who receive workers’ compensation benefits from uninsured motorist coverage, and because TRMT was not otherwise required to offer such coverage, Plaintiffs could not recover from TRMT. View "Harris v. Haynes" on Justia Law

Employee suffered bilateral shoulder injuries and underwent separate surgeries on each shoulder. Employee later agreed to a voluntary buyout of his employment. Employee subsequently filed two separate suits for workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court determined that Employee’s permanent partial disability benefits were not capped at one and one-half times the impairment rating and awarded ninety percent permanent partial disability benefits. Employer appealed. A Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel modified the award of permanent partial disability benefits to 37.5 percent as capped at one and one-half times the impairment rating, concluding that Employee’s decision to accept the buyout was not “reasonable” for purposes of the statutory cap. The Supreme Court reversed in part and reinstated the judgment of the trial court as to the award of ninety percent permanent partial disability benefits, holding that because Employee acted reasonably by accepting the voluntary buyout for reasons related to his work injuries, the award for permanent partial disability was not subject to the one-and-one-half-times multiplier. View "Yang v. Nissan N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Employee worked for Employer from 1977 through the date of the trial of this matter. Employee began having problems with his arms and hands in 2005. In 2009, Employee had carpal tunnel release surgery performed on his arms. Employee began having problems with his right thumb shortly after his surgeries. A surgical procedure to release the thumb was performed in 2010. In 2013, the trial court awarded permanent partial disability benefits to Employee but ruled that Employee’s injury should be apportioned to the arm, which was subject to an impairment “cap.” Employee appealed, arguing that the award should have been apportioned to the thumb, which was not subject to the cap. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the trial court correctly chose to apportion Employee’s injury to the arm. View "Evans v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co. " on Justia Law

Claimant was a licensed time-share salesperson who sold time-share interests at a resort. After resort management terminated the business relationship with Claimant, Claimant filed for state unemployment benefits. The Department of Labor and Workforce Development awarded benefits to claimant, concluding that the "qualified real estate agent" exclusion in the Tennessee Employment Security Law's definition of employment did not preclude Claimant from receiving unemployment benefits because Claimant was not a licensed real estate agent. The appeals tribunal and board of review affirmed. The chancery court reversed, determining that a time-share salesperson is a licensed real estate agent and therefore, Claimant was ineligible for unemployment benefits as a qualified real estate agent. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) a time-share salesperson is a licensed real estate agent within the Employment Security Law's qualified real estate agent exclusion; (2) Claimant satisfied the exclusion's criteria and was therefore a qualified real estate agent; and (3) consequently, Claimant was ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits. View "Westgate Smoky Mountains at Gatlinburg v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Employee suffered a right shoulder injury while working for Employer. After a benefit review conference in the Department of Labor and Workforce Development ended in an impasse, Employee filed suit for workers' compensation benefits. Prior to trial, Employer requested the appointment of an independent medical examiner pursuant to the medical impairment rating (MIR) process in Tenn. Code. Ann. 50-6-204(d)(5). Because the suit had already been filed, the trial court denied the request and subsequently awarded compensation to Employee. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for consideration of the constitutionality of the MIR process. On remand, the trial court concluded (1) section 50-6-204(d)(5), which requires the courts to consider the opinion of an independent medical examiner under that section as presumptively accurate, is an unconstitutional infringement upon the powers of the judiciary; and (2) in the alternative, the statutory presumption was overcome in this case. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the MIR process does not violate constitutional principles; and (2) the evidence in this case did not clearly and convincingly rebut the statutory presumption. Remanded. View "Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone N.A. Tire, LLC" on Justia Law

A group of sergeants employed within the county sheriff's office were paid varying amounts within an established pay range. The sergeants filed a grievance regarding the pay disparities. The sheriff's department civil service board upheld the grievance and ordered the sheriff to equalize the pay of all the sergeants in the sheriff's office. On appeal, the county chancery court declared the board's ruling null and void, holding that the board did not have the authority to order pay equalization. The court of appeals agreed that the board exceeded its statutory authority but remanded the cause to the board so it could direct the sheriff to pay all sergeants the same hourly rate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in the absence of proof that the sheriff violated state law or the sheriff's department civil service manual, the board lacked the power to order salary equalization; and (2) the board exceeded its authority in ordering the sheriff to correct the pay disparity, as there was no proof the sheriff violated state law, and the civil service manual specifically gave the sheriff authority to make individual pay determinations. View "Hammond v. Harvey" on Justia Law