Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In these consolidated cases, the primary issue was whether there was liability insurance coverage for Plaintiffs' injuries resulting from an altercation on the premises of Insured's bar and restaurant. Insurer denied coverage and declined to defend Insured based on its determination that there was no coverage under the terms of the policy. The trial court entered an order finding that the altercation was covered under both the commercial general liability and liquor liability provisions of the policy. The court of appeals ruled that the liquor liability coverage agreement provided coverage for the judgments but that the commercial general liability agreement provided no coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based on the clear terms of the policy agreement, there was no liability coverage because the incident arose from an assault and battery, which was an excluded cause, and because there was no nonexcluded concurrent cause to provide coverage; and (2) estoppel by judgment did not apply to collaterally estop Insurer from arguing the lack of coverage. View "Clark v. Sputniks, LLC" on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, the primary issue was whether there was liability insurance coverage for Plaintiffs' injuries resulting from an altercation on the premises of Insured's bar and restaurant. Insurer denied coverage and declined to defend Insured based on its determination that there was no coverage under the terms of the policy. The trial court entered an order finding that the altercation was covered under both the commercial general liability and liquor liability provisions of the policy. The court of appeals ruled that the liquor liability coverage agreement provided coverage for the judgments but that the commercial general liability agreement provided no coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based on the clear terms of the policy agreement, there was no liability coverage because the incident arose from an assault and battery, which was an excluded cause, and because there was no nonexcluded concurrent cause to provide coverage; and (2) estoppel by judgment did not apply to collaterally estop Insurer from arguing the lack of coverage. View "Gamble v. Sputniks, LLC" on Justia Law

The trial court awarded workers' compensation benefits to an injured lineman who had violated a rule requiring the use of protective gloves while in a bucket lift. The employer appealed, contending that the statutory defenses of willful misconduct and, more particularly, the willful failure or refusal to use a safety appliance or device precluded recovery. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the case, holding that because the evidence established that the employee admitted his knowledge of a regularly enforced safety rule, understood the rationale for the rule, and willfully failed to comply, the injuries he suffered because of the rule violation were not compensable. View "Mitchell v. Fayetteville Pub. Utils." on Justia Law

In this appeal, Defendants sought a review of the trial court's decision to award Plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages based on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of inadequate maintenance of the cemetery where Plaintiff's son was buried. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff had failed to present sufficient proof establishing that she had suffered a serious mental injury, which was a required element of her claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the trial court awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys fees, holding that Plaintiff failed to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress because she provided no evidence that she or anyone else suffered serious mental injuries as a result of Defendants' conduct. View "Rogers v. Louisville Land Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, survivors of a tenant killed by the criminal act of another tenant, filed suit against Defendant housing authority. Plaintiffs alleged Defendant was negligent in failing to evict the other tenant at the first instance of violent behavior. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment claiming federal regulations preempted Plaintiffs' negligence claim and that it was immune from suit under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (the GLTA). The trial court denied summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding (1) Plaintiffs' negligence suit was not preempted by federal law; and (2) Defendant's failure to evict was an operational decision and Defendant was not entitled to immunity under the GTLA. Remanded. View "Giggers v. Memphis Hous. Auth." on Justia Law

At issue in this consumer protection case was which Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure applied to a motion that sought relief from a default judgment of liability on a counter-complaint, where the motion was filed within thirty days of entry of the default, the trial court did not expressly direct the entry of judgment on the counter-complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, and neither liability on the original complaint nor damages on the counter-complaint were determined. The trial court entered default judgment in favor of the consumer on her counterclaims against Discover Bank and awarded the consumer damages. The court of appeals upheld the default judgment, vacated the award of damages, and remanded the case for a new hearing on damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 54.02, rather than Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, applies in this situation, but the same test applies to motions seeking relief from default judgment, under either rule, on the basis of "excusable neglect"; and (2) actual damages are recoverable for loss of available credit under Tennessee Consumer Protection Act where the plaintiff suffers a demonstrable loss of credit, proximately caused by the defendant, resulting in actual harm. View "Discover Bank v. Morgan " on Justia Law

Employee, a certified nursing assistant, sustained an injury while working. Six months later, Employee returned to work with significant restrictions on the use of his right arm. After two weeks of training for a different position, Employee resigned. Employee later made a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The trial court held that Employee did not have a meaningful return to work and applied a multiplier of six to the assigned impairment rating. A special workers' compensation panel reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in ruling that Employee had not made a meaningful return to work and reducing the award to one-and-one-half times the impairment rating. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence demonstrated that Employee did have a meaningful return to work. View "Williamson v. Baptist Hosp. of Cocke County, Inc." on Justia Law

A victim of alleged child sexual abuse purportedly perpetrated by one of the priests of the Catholic Diocese of Memphis in the 1970s filed suit against the Bishop of the Diocese, seeking monetary damages. The Diocese moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine deprived state courts of subject mater jurisdiction and that the victim's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the Diocese's motion. The court of appeals held (1) the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred state courts from considering the victim's negligent hiring and retention claims but not the negligent supervision claims; and (2) the statute of limitations had run on the victim's claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the state courts had subject matter jurisdiction over the victim's claims; and (2) the victim's claims were not barred by the statute of limitations. Remanded. View "Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for the Diocese of Memphis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a personal injury suit against The Royal Group. The Royal Group filed an answer alleging the comparative fault of Aaron Rents. Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint adding Aaron Rents as a defendant. The one-year statute of limitations applicable to Plaintiffs' cause of action, however, had expired before The Royal Group filed its answer naming Aaron Rents. As a result, Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint within ninety days of The Royal Group's answer, relying on Tenn. Code Ann. 20-1-119. Aaron Rents thereafter alleged fault against Fulmarque. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a second amended complaint, naming Fulmarque as a defendant. The trial court eventually granted summary judgment in favor of Fulmarque, concluding (1) the action was barred by the statute of limitations, and (2) the ninety-day window provided by section 20-1-119 was not triggered by Aaron Rents' answer alleging comparative fault against Fulmarque. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court, holding that section 20-1-119 does not afford successive ninety-day windows during which a plaintiff may file an amended complaint naming a nonparty defendant as a comparative tort-feasor. View "Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc." on Justia Law

Employee fell and struck both knees on a concrete landing in the course of his employment with Employer. Employee's left knee required surgery and his right knee received limited medical treatment. The treating physician assigned eight percent permanent impairment to the left leg. Employee's evaluating physician assigned thirteen percent impairment to the left leg and twenty percent impairment to the right leg. The trial court adopted the evaluating physician's opinions and awarded fifty percent permanent partial disability to both legs. The Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err (1) by finding that Employee sustained a permanent injury to the right knee; (2) by adopting the impairment rating of the evaluating physician for Employee's right and left knee injury; and (3) in awarding fifty percent permanent partial disability to both legs, where Employee had significant activity restrictions as a result of the injury. View "Hale v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa." on Justia Law