Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court overruled State v. Jacumin, in which the Court rejected a totality-of-the circumstances analysis for determining whether an affidavit establishes probable cause and instead adopted another test derived from two earlier United States Supreme Court decisions. Defendant here was charged with multiple offenses in connection with a drug trafficking conspiracy. Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during a search, arguing that the affidavit supporting the search warrant failed to establish probable cause. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant was then found guilty of six offenses. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling on Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed the intermediate appellate court’s decision holding that the search warrant was invalid, holding (1) henceforth, a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis applies for determining whether an affidavit establishes probable cause for issuance of a warrant, and applying this standard, the search warrant in this case sufficiently established probable cause; (2) the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support two of Defendant’s convictions; and (3) the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in upholding that trial court’s judgment ordering forfeiture of the $1,098,050 cash seized when the search warrant was executed. View "State v. Tuttle" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Stephen Michael West and Derrick D. Schofield were each convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. Plaintiffs bought a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that the written protocol by which the Tennessee Department of Correction carries out an execution by lethal injection violates the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. The trial court denied relief to Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) concluding that Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden of demonstrating that the protocol, on its face, violates the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment; and (2) dismissing Plaintiffs’ claims that the protocol requires violations of federal drug laws. View "West v. Schofield" on Justia Law

In 2009, Appellant pleaded guilty to attempted rape of a child. That same year, Appellant began serving his sentence. On March 26, 2013, a Tennessee Board of Parole hearing officer conducted a parole hearing for Appellant based on a release eligibility date of June 14, 2013. The hearing offer recommended that parole be denied. The Board concurred and deferred the next parole hearing until 2013. Appellant filed a petition of certiorari, asserting that the Board’s decision was illegal, contrary to established law, and arbitrary and capricious. The trial court dismissed the petition. Appellant appealed. The Court of Appeals did not consider the issues raised by Appellant but, instead, determined that Appellant’s release eligibility date was April 3, 2015. The Court of Appeals then remanded the case to the trial court with instructions for the Board to conduct an immediate parole hearing for Appellant. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the Court of Appeals lacked the authority to calculate the date Appellant could be considered for parole and did so incorrectly. View "Brennan v. Tennessee Board of Parole" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for, inter alia, two counts of first degree premeditated murder. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his residence, ruling that the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act applied to the case despite ex post facto concerns. The jury then convicted Defendant as charged. The jury sentenced Defendant to life sentences without the possibility of parole for the murders. The court of criminal appeals upheld Defendant’s convictions and sentences. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Court should modify the Tennessee ex post facto analysis found in Miller v. State in light of Collins v. Youngblood. The Supreme Court affirmed on separate grounds, holding (1) Miller v. State is overruled; (2) the ex post facto clause of the Tennessee Constitution has the same definition and scope as the federal ex post facto clause; (3) the application of the Exclusionary Rule Reform Act to this case was not an ex post facto violation; (4) the trial court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of a search warrant; and (5) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining issues. View "State v. Pruitt" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of stalking. The conviction was based, in part, on Defendant’s act of posting disparaging signs about the victim on the victim’s private property and on the property of the victim's employer, the Maury County Board of Education. Defendant appealed, arguing that her conviction violated her First Amendment right to free speech. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the evidence presented by the State was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain Defendant’s conviction for the criminal offense of stalking. This holding necessarily pretermitted discussion of whether Defendant’s right to free speech was violated. View "State v. Flowers" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated rape, and facilitation of aggravated rape. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentences of death, holding (1) Defendant’s claims of evidentiary error were without merit; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the victims’ family members to wear buttons containing images of the victims; (3) the trial court properly effectuated merger of the convictions; (4) the sentences of death were not imposed in an arbitrary fashion; and (5) Defendant’s death sentences were neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. View "State v. Davidson" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of facilitation of possession with intent to deliver 0.5 grams or more of cocaine, an offense proscribed by Tenn. Code Ann. 39-17-417. Because the jury found that the facilitation occurred within 1,000 feet of a school, the trial court concluded that the Drug-Free School Zone Act applied, thus increasing Defendant’s felony classification and requiring service of the entire minimum sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, holding that the Act applied to a conviction for facilitation and that there was sufficient evidence to support the facilitation conviction. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the trial court erred in applying the Act to Defendant’s conviction for facilitation by requiring service of the entire minimum sentence and by increasing the felony classification; and (2) the State’s evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt on the lesser-included offense of facilitation of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a school. View "State v. Gibson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of nine counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, thirteen counts of observation without consent, and other offenses arising from his hidden-camera videotaping of his twelve-year-old daughter and her teenage friend while they were in various states of undress. Defendant appealed his convictions for especially aggravated sexual exploitation and his sentence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, concluding that the hidden-camera videos constituted child pornography prohibited under the child sexual exploitation statutes. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Defendant’s convictions for especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, holding (1) the use of the six specific factors set forth in United States v. Dost as a “test” or analytical framework in assessing whether material is prohibited under the three child sexual exploitation statutes is hereby rejected; (2) the material at issue must be evaluated based on what is depicted, without reference to the defendant’s subjective intent; and (3) under the correct framework, the videos taken by Defendant do not include a minor engaging in a lascivious exhibition, and therefore, the videos are insufficient to support Defendant’s convictions for especially aggravated child sexual exploitation. View "State v. Whited" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with two counts of vehicular homicide and other crimes arising from a single-vehicle accident that killed two occupants of the vehicle. Defendant filed a motion to suppress any evidence derived from a blood sample obtained from her without a warrant the night of the accident. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant had orally consented to the blood draw. Defendant then filed a second motion to suppress. The trial court granted Defendant’s second motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant had not actually consented to the blood draw and that the police lacked reasonable grounds to believe Defendant was driving under the influence, which was required under the implied consent statute to justify the warrantless blood draw. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the police had probable cause to believe that Defendant was driving while intoxicated at the time of the accident, and thus, the implied consent statute was triggered. View "State v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

A five-count indictment charged Defendant with several felonies and with employment a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. A jury found Defendant guilty on all counts. Defendant appealed, arguing that the indictment for the firearm charge must be dismissed because it did not designate the predicate felony for the firearm charge. The Court of Criminal Appeals (1) reversed the conviction and dismissed the charge of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felon, holding that the indictment on the firearm charge did not meet constitutional requirements; and (2) affirmed the remaining convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) considering the entire indictment, the count of the indictment charging Defendant with employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony was sufficient to meet the constitutional requirement; but (2) the trial court erred in its instructions to the jury on the charge of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Remanded for a new trial on that charge. View "State v. Duncan" on Justia Law