Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of fabricating evidence and six counts of making a false report. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial. After a hearing, the trial court affirmed Defendant’s convictions for making a false report but reversed Defendant’s fabricating evidence convictions. The court of criminal appeals dismissed as multiplicitous two of Defendant’s convictions for making a false report, reinstated the convictions for fabricating evidence, and affirmed the remaining convictions. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the court of criminal appeals’ reinstatement of Defendant’s convictions for fabricating evidence; (2) dismissed two of Defendant’s convictions for making a false report for lack of sufficient evidence; (3) dismissed two of Defendant’s convictions for making a false report as multiplicitous; and (4) affirmed the court of criminal appeals in all other respects. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to two counts of vehicular homicide and was sentenced to twenty-four years' imprisonment. Defendant twice appealed his sentence. On both appeals the court of criminal appeals remanded the case for resentencing, and on each remand the trial court imposed a twenty-four year sentence. No appeal was filed from the third sentencing order. Defendant subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to appeal the third sentencing order. At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that he and Defendant discussed a third appeal and that Defendant agreed that no appeal would be filed. The post-conviction court denied post-conviction relief, finding the testimony of trial counsel to be more credible than the testimony of Defendant and concluding that Defendant knew of his right to appeal and waived that right. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial counsel’s failure to file a written waiver of appeal as required by Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(d)(2) did not violate Defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel; and (2) Defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence his allegations of ineffective representation. View "Arroyo v. State " on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, pleaded guilty to patronizing prostitution and was granted judicial diversion. Petitioner successfully completed his diversion, and his criminal record was subsequently expunged. Approximately three years after the entry of his plea, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was entitled to relief under Padilla v. Kentucky because his trial counsel failed to inform him of the immigration consequences of his plea. The trial court dismissed the petition on the grounds that it was time-barred. The court of criminal appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary dismissal of the petition, concluding that a petitioner whose record has been expunged may not obtain post-conviction relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Post-Conviction Procedure Act may not be used to collaterally attack a guilty plea that has been expunged after successful completion of judicial diversion. View "Rodriguez v. State" on Justia Law

After being arrested and while in custody, Defendant admitted his involvement in Maurice Taylor’s killing. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted aggravated robbery and first-degree felony murder. The court of criminal appeals reversed, concluding (1) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress his pretrial confession because the confession was the result of an illegal arrest and detention; and (2) insufficient evidence supported the convictions because the State did not introduce sufficient evidence, other than Defendant’s confession, to corroborate the commission of the attempted robbery. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Defendant’s convictions and sentences, holding (1) the police had probable cause to arrest Defendant; and (2) Defendant’s confession did not require corroboration because he repeated his confession under oath at trial, but, had his extrajudicial confession required corroboration, the State presented sufficient evidence that this confession was trustworthy. View "State v. Bishop" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was stopped for a moving violation, a law enforcement officer administered several field sobriety tests. The officer arrested Plaintiff for DUI because he had been driving in the wrong direction on a divided highway, smelled of alcohol, and admitted he had been drinking. Plaintiff filed a motion to suppress the evidence and to dismiss the charges of DUI and DUI per se. The trial court dismissed the charges, concluding that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff in light of his performance on the field sobriety tests. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the charges, holding that the officer had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for DUI because, even considering Plaintiff’s successful performance on the field sobriety tests, Plaintiff’s moving violation, the odor of alcohol, and Plaintiff’s admission to drinking were sufficient to permit a prudent person to believe Plaintiff was driving under the influence of an intoxicant. View "State v. Bell" on Justia Law

In 2000, Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted rape. In 2010, the Supreme Court filed its opinion in Ward v. State, in which the Court held that trial courts, before accepting a guilty plea to a crime carrying a mandatory sentence of lifetime community supervision, must inform the defendant desiring to plead guilty of the consequence of lifetime supervision. In 2011, Defendant filed a petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, alleging that his guilty pleas were not knowing or voluntary because he had not been informed that he would be subject to lifetime community supervision. The trial court concluded that Defendant was entitled to post-conviction relief because (1) Ward should be applied retroactively, and (2) the applicable statute of limitations should be tolled on due process grounds. The court of criminal appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the holding in Ward does not require retroactive application, and therefore, Defendant was not entitled to tolling under Tenn. Code Ann. 40-30-102(b)(1); and (2) Defendant’s case did not warrant due process tolling. View "Bush v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The court of criminal appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding (1) the evidence of identification was sufficient as to both convictions; and (2) as to the aggravated burglary, the victim had not given his “effective consent” to the entry of the residence. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the aggravated robbery conviction, holding that the identification evidence was sufficient as to both offenses; but (2) reversed the aggravated burglary conviction, holding that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the conviction because no reasonable factfinder could conclude that Defendant’s entry of the residence was without the victim’s “effective consent.” Remanded for a new trial on the lesser included offenses of aggravated criminal trespass and criminal trespass. View "State v. Pope" on Justia Law

Petitioner pled guilty to the felony charge of child neglect and to the misdemeanor charge of child abuse. About six months later, Petitioner for a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's failure to advise him of the immigration consequences of his plea and that his plea was unknowing and involuntary because the trial court failed to comply with Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(J). The post-conviction trial court denied relief. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial counsel did not perform deficiently; and (2) the trial court's failure to comply with Rule 11(b)(1)(J) was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Garcia v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, and especially aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the murder convictions and imposed consecutive sentences of life for the murder and eighteen years for the especially aggravated robbery. As support for consecutive sentencing, the trial court ruled that Defendant qualified as a dangerous offender. The court of criminal appeals remanded to the trial court for a reconsideration of whether the sentences should be served concurrently or consecutively because the trial court had failed to specifically address underlying factors essential to a dangerous offender classification. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when a trial court places findings on the record to support its sentencing decision, the applicable standard of appellate review for a challenge to the imposition of consecutive sentences is abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness; and (2) the trial court in this case failed to address the factors required to impose consecutive sentences based on the dangerous offender classification. Remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "State v. Pollard" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted first degree murder and one count each of especially aggravated burglary, attempted aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. In sentencing Defendant, the trial judge sentenced Defendant to consecutive twenty-five year sentences for each attempted first degree murder conviction. The court of criminal appeals (1) reduced one count of attempted first degree murder to attempted second degree murder, concluding that insufficient evidence supported the convictions, and modified the conviction of especially aggravated burglary to aggravated burglary; and (2) affirmed the other convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant's convictions of two counts of attempted first degree murder; and (2) the trial judge did not err in imposing consecutive sentencing for the two attempted first degree murder convictions. View "State v. Dickson" on Justia Law