Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of marijuana with intent to sell or deliver within 1,000 feet of a school zone, and other offenses. At the sentencing hearing, Defendant requested that the trial court place her on judicial diversion. The trial court denied Defendant’s request for judicial diversion, reasoning that there was a low likelihood that Defendant would be rehabilitated by judicial diversion. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of judicial diversion, concluding that the trial court failed to consider and weigh on the record all of the relevant factors in denying judicial diversion. The Supreme Court reinstated the trial court’s judgments, holding (1) the mandatory minimum service requirement of the Drug-Free School Zone Act does not render offenses under the Act ineligible for judicial diversion; and (2) although the trial court in this case failed adequately to address the appropriate factors on the record, Defendant’s request to be placed on judicial diversion was properly denied. View "State v. Dycus" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first degree premeditated murder for fatally shooting his wife. After Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in direct appeal, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by deciding not to consult an expert to rebut the anticipated testimony of a prosecution expert and by not attempting to introduce a potentially favorable hearsay statement. The post-conviction court denied the petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance from his trial counsel with regard to the issues before the Court on appeal. Remanded. View "Kendrick v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary and other charges. The trial judge did not expressly accept or approve of the jury’s verdict. After Defendant’s trial and before the sentencing hearing, the trial judge left the bench and a successor judge was designated. The designated judge held a sentencing hearing, sentenced Defendant, and transferred the matter to a different division for further proceedings. Defendant moved for a new trial, alleging that a successor judge could not act as the thirteenth juror because witness credibility was the “over-riding issue.” A successor judge conducted the hearing on the motion. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed on the thirteenth juror issue. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstated the judgments of the trial court, holding that the successor judge in this correctly determined that he could perform the function of the thirteenth juror and could independently weigh and assess the evidence adduced at Defendant’s trial so as to prevent a miscarriage of justice by the jury. View "State v. Ellis" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for seven counts of rape of a child victim. Two weeks before trial, the State sought to offer as evidence a video recording of a statement made by the victim to a forensic interviewer pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 24-7-123. The trial court denied admission of the video recording, concluding (1) the enactment of section 24-7-123 intruded upon the inherent authority of the judiciary to regulate the admissibility of evidence; (2) the video-recorded statement qualified as hearsay evidence not admissible under any exception to the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence; and (3) the admission of the video recording would violate Defendant’s right to confront witnesses. The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the State’s request for an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 24-7-123 does not unconstitutionally infringe upon the powers of the judiciary and is a valid legislative exception to the general rule against the admission of hearsay evidence; and (2) the admission of video-recorded statements does not violate a defendant’s right of confrontation so long as the child witness authenticates the video recording and appears for cross-examination at trial. View "State v. McCoy" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to death. Defendant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to a new trial on the murder conviction but was entitled to a new sentencing hearing based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient performance of his trial counsel, the verdict of guilt for first degree murder would have been different. Remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "Nesbit v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on six counts of aggravated sexual battery and four counts of rape of a child for sexually abusing his stepdaughter. Defendant moved to suppress a surreptitiously-recorded conversation with the child’s mother, who was secretly cooperating with the police in their investigation of the abuse. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the admission of Defendant’s recorded conversation with the child's mother did not violate his constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination because, under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant’s incriminating statements were admissible because they were made voluntarily. View "State v. Sanders" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of seven counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery arising from the sexual abuse of his children. The court of criminal appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions because the State presented adequate evidence corroborating Defendant’s confession to his wife; (2) the trial court properly refused to suppress surreptitiously-recorded conversations between Defendant and his wife; (3) the trial court erred by admitting evidence that Defendant possessed and viewed adult pornography, but the error was harmless; and (4) any error in jury instructions given during trial that the mental state of “recklessness” could support a conviction for aggravated sexual battery was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary and employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court (1) erred by denying his request for a special jury instruction on the definition of actual and constructive possession as an element of employment of a firearm, and (2) erred by failing to instruct the jury on the crime of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony as a lesser included offense. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err by refusing Defendant’s request for a special instruction on the definition of possession; and (2) possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony qualifies as a lesser included offense of employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, but Defendant waived the issue and was not entitled to relief under the plain error doctrine. View "State v. Fayne" on Justia Law

A Shelby County grand jury indicted Defendant for two counts of first degree premeditated murder and two counts of first degree murder for the murders of Lillian and Clarence James. During trial, the court admitted evidence of a third murder allegedly committed by Defendant in another state, concluding that the out-of-state murder constituted a signature crime and was relevant to the issue of identity. The jury returned verdicts of guilt for the felony murder and the premeditated murder of the two victims. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding (1) the trial court erred by allowing the proof of the out-of-state murder, as the similarities involved in that murder did rise to the level of a signature crime, and, under the circumstances, the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value of the evidence; and (2) the error was not harmless. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, criminal exposure of another to HIV, and aggravated statutory rape. The trial judge sentenced Defendant to an effective sentence of 174 years. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed all eleven convictions of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, all six convictions of aggravated statutory rape, and four of the seven convictions for criminal exposure of another to HIV, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the separate convictions of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and aggravated statutory rape; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions for four counts of criminal exposure to HIV but insufficient evidence to support the convictions for three of the counts; and (3) Defendant’s sentence, as modified, was not excessive. View "State v. Hogg" on Justia Law