Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In these consolidated cases, the primary issue was whether there was liability insurance coverage for Plaintiffs' injuries resulting from an altercation on the premises of Insured's bar and restaurant. Insurer denied coverage and declined to defend Insured based on its determination that there was no coverage under the terms of the policy. The trial court entered an order finding that the altercation was covered under both the commercial general liability and liquor liability provisions of the policy. The court of appeals ruled that the liquor liability coverage agreement provided coverage for the judgments but that the commercial general liability agreement provided no coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based on the clear terms of the policy agreement, there was no liability coverage because the incident arose from an assault and battery, which was an excluded cause, and because there was no nonexcluded concurrent cause to provide coverage; and (2) estoppel by judgment did not apply to collaterally estop Insurer from arguing the lack of coverage. View "Clark v. Sputniks, LLC" on Justia Law

In these consolidated cases, the primary issue was whether there was liability insurance coverage for Plaintiffs' injuries resulting from an altercation on the premises of Insured's bar and restaurant. Insurer denied coverage and declined to defend Insured based on its determination that there was no coverage under the terms of the policy. The trial court entered an order finding that the altercation was covered under both the commercial general liability and liquor liability provisions of the policy. The court of appeals ruled that the liquor liability coverage agreement provided coverage for the judgments but that the commercial general liability agreement provided no coverage. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) based on the clear terms of the policy agreement, there was no liability coverage because the incident arose from an assault and battery, which was an excluded cause, and because there was no nonexcluded concurrent cause to provide coverage; and (2) estoppel by judgment did not apply to collaterally estop Insurer from arguing the lack of coverage. View "Gamble v. Sputniks, LLC" on Justia Law

Regent Investments sued Earline Waddle and Lorene Elrod alleging that Regent contracted to purchase real property from Waddle, but that afterwards Regent discovered Waddle had conveyed one-half of her interest in the property to Elrod. Waddle filed a cross-claim against Elrod, alleging that Elrod had acquired her interest in the property through undue influence. Regent later dismissed its claims. Waddle subsequently agreed to settle the case against Elrod by way of emails sent by the parties' attorneys. Elrod, however, refused to sign the settlement documents. The trial court entered an order enforcing the settlement agreement. Elrod appealed, arguing that the Statue of Frauds precluded enforcement of the settlement agreement. The court of appeals affirmed, reasoning that the Statute of Frauds applies only to contracts for the sale of lands. The Supreme Court affirmed on alternate grounds, holding (1) the Statute of Frauds applies to settlement agreements requiring the transfer of an interest in real property; but (2) the Statute of Frauds did not bar enforcement of the settlement agreement at issue in this appeal because the emails that the parties' counsel exchanged and the legal description of the property included in the cross claim satisfied the Statute of Frauds. View "Waddle v. Elrod" on Justia Law

In this appeal, Defendants sought a review of the trial court's decision to award Plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages based on the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of inadequate maintenance of the cemetery where Plaintiff's son was buried. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff had failed to present sufficient proof establishing that she had suffered a serious mental injury, which was a required element of her claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the trial court awarding Plaintiff compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys fees, holding that Plaintiff failed to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress because she provided no evidence that she or anyone else suffered serious mental injuries as a result of Defendants' conduct. View "Rogers v. Louisville Land Co." on Justia Law

At issue in this consumer protection case was which Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure applied to a motion that sought relief from a default judgment of liability on a counter-complaint, where the motion was filed within thirty days of entry of the default, the trial court did not expressly direct the entry of judgment on the counter-complaint pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02, and neither liability on the original complaint nor damages on the counter-complaint were determined. The trial court entered default judgment in favor of the consumer on her counterclaims against Discover Bank and awarded the consumer damages. The court of appeals upheld the default judgment, vacated the award of damages, and remanded the case for a new hearing on damages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 54.02, rather than Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, applies in this situation, but the same test applies to motions seeking relief from default judgment, under either rule, on the basis of "excusable neglect"; and (2) actual damages are recoverable for loss of available credit under Tennessee Consumer Protection Act where the plaintiff suffers a demonstrable loss of credit, proximately caused by the defendant, resulting in actual harm. View "Discover Bank v. Morgan " on Justia Law

A construction company (Contractor) entered into a contract with the State to restructure an interstate interchange. The contract contained an incentive clause stating that no incentive payment would be made if work was not completed in its entirety by December 15, 2006. After the work was completed, Contractor filed a complaint alleging that the State had breached the contract by refusing to grant an appropriate time extension of the completion date, the disincentive date, and the incentive date. The claims commission (1) found that the contract contained a latent ambiguity requiring extrinsic evidence to interpret the contract, and (2) considered extrinsic evidence in concluding that Contractor was entitled to the maximum incentive payment and an extension of the contract completion date. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the contract was unambiguous and did not permit an extension of the incentive date, and (2) therefore, Contractor was not entitled to an incentive bonus. Remanded. View "Ray Bell Constr. Co. v. State" on Justia Law

The president of a company signed a commercial credit application, which contained language immediately above the signature line stating that the individual signing the contract personally guaranteed amounts owed to the vendor. The company defaulted on the balance of the account, and the vendor filed suit against both the company and the president. The trial court granted summary judgment to the vendor, holding that the president had signed the contract both personally and in a representative capacity. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the president had signed the contract only in a representative capacity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the application contained clear and unambiguous language sufficient to bind the president as an individual guarantor of the contract. View "84 Lumber Co. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant contractor entered into a contract to replace a roof. When the newly installed roof developed leaks, Defendant hired an independent contractor to make repairs. While performing the work, the independent contractor caused a fire, resulting in a large insurance claim by the homeowners. As subrogor to the homeowners' rights and claims arising out of the fire, Plaintiff insurance company sued Defendant in tort and contract. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims, finding that because Defendant had subcontracted the work, he could not be liable. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant had an implied non-delegable duty to install the roof in a careful, skillful, diligent, and workmanlike manner. Remanded. View "Fed. Ins. Co. v. Winters " on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured while driving his employer's tow truck. Plaintiff filed suit against the driver of the other car involved in the accident, and later sought to invoke his employer's uninsured motorist policy in an amount equal to the liability coverage for bodily injury. The employer's insurer filed a motion for partial summary judgment, seeking to limit uninsured motorist coverage to the amount listed in the policy rather than the amount fixed by statute. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals reversed, directing that the insurer's motion for partial summary judgment be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when the insured signs an application indicating the selection of uninsured motorist coverage lower than the liability limits but neglects to initial a provision designed to confirm the selection of coverage less than the standard provided by statute, the requirement under Tenn. Code Ann. 56-7-1201(a)(2) that the selection be in writing has been satisfied. View "Kiser v. Wolfe" on Justia Law

In 1992, Appellant Wendell Baugh, III acquired Precision Services, Inc. from Ronald and Gayla Miller. The Millers agreed to finance the transaction. Mr. Baugh and his wife personally guaranteed a note executed by the corporation that purchased Precision's assets and the right to use its name. Appellee Herman Novak and his wife were friends and neighbors of the Baughs. In 1995, Messrs. Baugh and Novak bought a company together (Penske Plastics, Inc.), and by contract, were jointly and severally liable for the company's debts and obligations. Both gentlemen agreed to share equally in the company's profits. Mr. Baugh offered to sell one-half of Precision to Mr. Novak. Before he could sell any interest in Precision, Mr. Baugh had to obtain permission from the Millers. Because Mr. Baugh found the Millers difficult to deal with, he asked his attorney to draft an arrangement so that Mr. Novak could purchase an interest in Precision without the Millers' involvement. The document drafted by the attorney included an indemnity agreement by which the Novaks would agree to indemnify the Baughs for fifty percent of any payments they were required to make on the Millers' note and Precision's other debts. Mr. Baugh kept an office at Penske Plastics. Fire destroyed Penske's building in 2003. Of import, a banker-box that contained the original signed copies of the Baugh-Novak 1995 purchase agreement was consumed in the fire. The companies' insurance policies were not enough to cover all the damage caused by the fire. In 2005, Messrs. Baugh and Novak sold Penske Plastics to Alcan Baltec. Up until the time of the closing, Precision's loan obligations were paid from the revenue of Penske Plastics. In late 2005, Mr. Novak sent Mr. Baugh a note essentially "washing his hands" of Precision. In 2006, Mr. Baugh began paying Precision's obligation to the Millers from his personal funds. Mr. Baugh filed suit against the Novaks to enforce the terms of the 1995 agreement, arguing that he was entitled to indemnification and reimbursement for Precision's obligations. The trial court ruled in favor of Mr. Baugh. Mr. Novak appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in several of its evidentiary rulings at trial. The appellate court, on its own motion, reversed the trial court, holding that the purchase agreement and indemnity agreements were contrary to public policy and state law. The Supreme Court found that the evidence did not support the appellate court's holding. The Court reinstated the trial court's decision, and dismissed the Novak's appeal.