Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Buyer purchased a manufactured home from Sellers. The parties entered into a contract setting forth the terms of the sale and the parties obligations. The contract contained an arbitration provision under which Sellers retained the right to seek relief in a judicial forum for limited purposes. Buyer later brought a breach of contract action against Sellers, and Sellers filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court denied the motion to compel, holding that the non-mutuality remedies in the arbitration provision rendered it unconscionable and invalid. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Sellers’ retention of a judicial forum for limited purposes did not render the arbitration agreement unconscionable. View "Berent v. CMH Homes, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff contracted to sell Defendants certain real property. The contract provided that Plaintiff would retain ownership of a sixty-foot wide strip of property to provide access to her remaining property, but the warranty deed failed to include the reservation. When it became difficult for Plaintiff to access her property due to improvements on the purchased real property, Plaintiff sued Defendants, alleging, among other claims that were subsequently dismissed, breach of contract. The trial court ruled for Plaintiff on the breach of contract claim and awarded her $650,000 in damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the gravamen of Plaintiff’s prevailing claim was injury to real property, and therefore, the claim was barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to “actions for injuries to personal or real property.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff’s claim was not barred by the three-year statute of limitations because the gravamen of Plaintiff’s prevailing claim was breach of contract, to which the six-year statute of limitations for “actions on contracts not otherwise expressly provided for” applied. View "Benz-Elliott v. Barrett Enters., LP" on Justia Law

A man and a woman entered into a contract with a surrogate and her husband that provided for the surrogate to be artificially inseminated by the sperm of the intended father. After giving birth, the surrogate was meant to relinquish the child to the biological father and the intended mother. Seventeen days prior to the birth of the child, a juvenile court issued a consent order that declared the paternity of the child, granted custody to the intended parents, and terminated the parental rights of the surrogate. Approximately one week after the surrogate gave birth, she filed a series of motions asking the magistrate to vacate the consent order, set aside the surrogacy contract, and award her custody. The magistrate denied the motions. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the juvenile court’s order terminating the parental rights of the surrogate but otherwise affirmed, holding (1) public policy requires compliance with the statutory procedures for the termination of parental rights and does not allow parties to terminate the parental rights of a traditional surrogate through judicial ratification of a traditional surrogacy contract; and (2) in this instance, the contractual provisions circumventing the statutory procedures for the termination of parental rights were unenforceable. Remanded. View "In re Baby" on Justia Law

On July 28, 2012, Michael Becker was injured when a Ford truck driven by his son, Phillip Becker, struck a light pole. Michael and his wife filed suit against Ford Motor Company. On August 26, 2013, Ford filed an answer claiming that the accident was caused by a person other than Ford. On October 1, 2013, the Beckers filed a motion to join Phillip as a party to whom fault could be apportioned and a motion to file an amended complaint. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether, after a defendant asserts a comparative fault claim against a non-party tortfeasor who was known to the plaintiff when the original suit was filed, Tenn. Code Ann. 20-1-119 permits the plaintiff to amend its complaint to assert a claim directly against the tortfeasor named by the defendant. The Court held (1) application of section 20-1-119 is not restricted to tortfeasors who were unknown to the plaintiff when its original complaint was filed; and (2) therefore, the statute permits a plaintiff to file an amended complaint against the tortfeasor named by the defendant within ninety days after the filing of the answer in which the defendant first asserts a comparative fault claim against the tortfeasor. View "Becker v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was the minor beneficiary of a $100,000 life insurance policy. Plaintiff filed a complaint against his financial guardian and the insurance company after the guardian misappropriated the insurance proceeds. The trial court entered judgments in favor of Plaintiff. The insurance company appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that, by entrusting the proceeds to the guardian, the insurance company breached its contractual duties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the insurance company acted in good faith when it relied upon the validity of a juvenile court order establishing a financial guardianship in making payment of the life insurance proceeds, and (2) therefore, the insurance company could not be liable for breach of contract. View "Hood v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

A mother sued Ford Motor Company on behalf of her six-year-old son, whose spine was fractured in a car wreck, alleging that the defective design of the seatbelt in the vehicle caused her son's permanent paralysis and other injuries. The jury returned a $43.8 million verdict for compensatory damages. Ford's share of the verdict, based on its degree of fault, was $6,570,000. Ford filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the verdict was excessive. The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeals, however, determined that the verdict was excessive and remanded the case with a suggestion of remittitur from $43.8 million to $12.9 million. The suggested remittitur would reduce Ford's share of the verdict to $1,935,000. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and reinstated the jury's verdict, holding (1) the court of appeals had the authority to suggest a remittitur even though Ford did not request it; but (2) the court of appeals erred in remitting the verdict to $12.9 million, as the jury's verdict was supported by material evidence and was within the range of reasonableness. Remanded. View "Meals ex rel. Meals v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

A contract required payment of "fee residuals" from customers referred by BSG, LLC to Check Velocity, a company providing check re-presentment services. The contract provided that payment of fee residuals survived the termination of the agreement between the parties and continued until the "expiration of the Customer agreements as they may be renewed." Two agreements were executed between a referred customer and Check Velocity. The first agreement, which expired by its own terms, provided for check re-presentment services. The second agreement continued the re-presentment services required by the first agreement and added additional services. In addition, other terms of the first agreement were changed, including a choice of law provision. The Supreme Court held that the second agreement with additional services and changed terms was not a renewal of the first agreement, thus reversing the court of appeals and affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Check Velocity.View "BSG, LLC v. Check Velocity, Inc." on Justia Law

Husband and Wife signed a contract to make mutual wills and then executed those wills. Soon after Husband's death, Wife executed a new will that was inconsistent with her previous will. Following Wife's death, the children of Husband's earlier marriage filed an action asserting, among other things, that their stepmother's last will was invalid because it breached the contract to prepare mutual wills and that the will prepared by their stepmother pursuant to the contract to make mutual wills should be admitted into probate rather than her last will. The trial court granted summary judgment to Husband's children, determining that the contract to make mutual wills was supported by adequate consideration and that, therefore, Wife's last will was null and void. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Husband's children were entitled to judgment as a matter of law sustaining their challenge to the validity of Wife's will because, as a matter of law, the contract to make mutual wills was supported by adequate consideration. View "In re Estate of Brown" on Justia Law

Oak Ridge FM, Inc. contractually agreed for Dick Broadcasting Company (DBC) to have a right of first refusal to purchase Oak Ridge's radio station assets. The agreement was assignable by DBC only with Oak Ridge's consent. DBC subsequently asked Oak Ridge to consent to the assignment of the right-of-first-refusal agreement, but Oak Ridge refused. Oak Ridge also refused to consent to the assignment of a time brokerage agreement and a consulting agreement, both of which lacked consent agreements. DBC sued Oak Ridge and others for breach of contract and violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The court of appeals vacated the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where parties have contracted to allow assignment of an agreement with the consent of the non-assigning party, and the agreement is silent regarding the anticipated standard of conduct in withholding consent, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requires the non-assigning party to act with good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner in deciding whether to consent to the assignment; and (2) genuine issues of material fact remained in dispute in this case. View "Dick Broad. Co., Inc. of Tenn. v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc." on Justia Law

Jerry and Martha Garrison witnessed their son's injuries after he was struck by a car. The son died afterwards. The Garrisons filed a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress against the owner and driver of the car. The Garrisons also served a copy of the complaint upon their insurance company, State Farm, pursuant to the uninsured motorist provisions of their policy. The policy covered damages for "bodily injury," and "bodily injury" was defined in the policy as "bodily injury to a person and sickness, disease, or death that results from it." The trial court determined that the "bodily injury" provision of the uninsured motorist statute covered mental injuries, and therefore, the policy provided, by operation of law, coverage for the Garrisons' emotional distress claim. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) as applied to this case, "bodily injury" did not include damages for emotional harm alone; and (2) the definition of "bodily injury" in the policy did not conflict with the uninsured motorist statute. View "Garrison v. Bickford " on Justia Law