Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a grand jury returned a presentment against Defendant for possession of marijuana, Defendant posted bond and was released. Thereafter, a grand jury issued a nineteen-count presentment against Defendant charging her with multiple crimes, including attempted first degree murder. The State moved to revoke Defendant’s bail. The trial court granted the motion pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 40-11-141(b). The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that section 40-11-141(b) violated Tenn. Const. art. I, 15. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for a bail revocation hearing, holding (1) a defendant has a constitutional right to pretrial release on bail; (2) however, this right is not absolute, and a defendant may forfeit his or her right to bail by subsequent criminal conduct; and (3) before pretrial bail can be revoked, the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. View "State v. Burgins" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for driving under the influence and violating the open container law. Defendant moved to suppress all evidence discovered during the search of her car. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, concluding that one of the officers who, in response to a dispatch, had detained Defendant unlawfully prolonged the investigatory stop. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court set aside the order of suppression, holding that the officer had a reasonable basis for extending the stop by ten to fifteen minutes while awaiting the arrival of a second officer, and the duration of the investigatory detention did not exceed the “proper parameters.” Remanded. View "State v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

Defendant’s minor daughter was diagnosed with a rare form of cancer and died at the age of fifteen. Defendant was indicted for neglect of a child under the age of eighteen based on her failure to obtain adequate medical treatment for her daughter. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the “spiritual treatment” exemption within the child abuse and neglect statute, which precludes the prosecution of parents who, under certain circumstances, provide treatment through prayer alone in lieu of medical treatment, is unconstitutional. The trial court rejected Defendant’s constitutional claims and denied her motion to dismiss. After a trial, the trial court concluded that Defendant did not qualify for the spiritual treatment exemption and found her guilty of child neglect. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the spiritual treatment exemption is not unconstitutionally vague; and (2) because the exemption may be elided without invalidating the remainder of the child abuse and neglect statute, Defendant’s remaining constitutional challenges would not afford relief. View "State v. Crank" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first degree premeditated murder for fatally shooting his wife. After Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed in direct appeal, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by deciding not to consult an expert to rebut the anticipated testimony of a prosecution expert and by not attempting to introduce a potentially favorable hearsay statement. The post-conviction court denied the petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner did not receive ineffective assistance from his trial counsel with regard to the issues before the Court on appeal. Remanded. View "Kendrick v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary and other charges. The trial judge did not expressly accept or approve of the jury’s verdict. After Defendant’s trial and before the sentencing hearing, the trial judge left the bench and a successor judge was designated. The designated judge held a sentencing hearing, sentenced Defendant, and transferred the matter to a different division for further proceedings. Defendant moved for a new trial, alleging that a successor judge could not act as the thirteenth juror because witness credibility was the “over-riding issue.” A successor judge conducted the hearing on the motion. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed on the thirteenth juror issue. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstated the judgments of the trial court, holding that the successor judge in this correctly determined that he could perform the function of the thirteenth juror and could independently weigh and assess the evidence adduced at Defendant’s trial so as to prevent a miscarriage of justice by the jury. View "State v. Ellis" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff was discharged from his position of Chief of Police for the City of Red Bank, he filed suit in the Chancery Court against the City, alleging statutory retaliatory discharge in violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act (TPPA) and age discrimination in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA). The Chancery Court (1) granted the City’s request to transfer the case to the Circuit Court; (2) granted the City’s request to proceed without a jury on the TPPA claim, citing Young v. Davis, which held that the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA) controls TPPA claims against governmental entities, and such claims must be tried without a jury in the manner prescribed by the GTLA; but (3) upheld Plaintiff’s request for a jury on his THRA claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the GLTA applies to claims brought against a municipality pursuant to the THRA, and therefore, Plaintiff’s THRA claim was required to be tried without the intervention of a jury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the GTLA did not govern Plaintiff’s THRA claim and that the Legislature has afforded a statutory right to trial by jury on THRA claims filed against governmental entities in chancery court. View "Sneed v. City of Red Bank" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for seven counts of rape of a child victim. Two weeks before trial, the State sought to offer as evidence a video recording of a statement made by the victim to a forensic interviewer pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 24-7-123. The trial court denied admission of the video recording, concluding (1) the enactment of section 24-7-123 intruded upon the inherent authority of the judiciary to regulate the admissibility of evidence; (2) the video-recorded statement qualified as hearsay evidence not admissible under any exception to the rule against the admission of hearsay evidence; and (3) the admission of the video recording would violate Defendant’s right to confront witnesses. The Court of Criminal Appeals denied the State’s request for an interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) section 24-7-123 does not unconstitutionally infringe upon the powers of the judiciary and is a valid legislative exception to the general rule against the admission of hearsay evidence; and (2) the admission of video-recorded statements does not violate a defendant’s right of confrontation so long as the child witness authenticates the video recording and appears for cross-examination at trial. View "State v. McCoy" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to death. Defendant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court concluded that Defendant was not entitled to a new trial on the murder conviction but was entitled to a new sentencing hearing based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient performance of his trial counsel, the verdict of guilt for first degree murder would have been different. Remanded for a new sentencing hearing. View "Nesbit v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on six counts of aggravated sexual battery and four counts of rape of a child for sexually abusing his stepdaughter. Defendant moved to suppress a surreptitiously-recorded conversation with the child’s mother, who was secretly cooperating with the police in their investigation of the abuse. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the admission of Defendant’s recorded conversation with the child's mother did not violate his constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination because, under the totality of the circumstances, Defendant’s incriminating statements were admissible because they were made voluntarily. View "State v. Sanders" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of seven counts of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery arising from the sexual abuse of his children. The court of criminal appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions because the State presented adequate evidence corroborating Defendant’s confession to his wife; (2) the trial court properly refused to suppress surreptitiously-recorded conversations between Defendant and his wife; (3) the trial court erred by admitting evidence that Defendant possessed and viewed adult pornography, but the error was harmless; and (4) any error in jury instructions given during trial that the mental state of “recklessness” could support a conviction for aggravated sexual battery was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "State v. Clark" on Justia Law