Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted an appeal in these two consolidated cases to clarify the remedy that should be applied when there is an abuse of prosecutorial discretion in the denial of an application for pretrial diversion. In each case, the prosecutor denied the defendant's petition for pretrial diversion, and the trial court ruled there was no abuse of discretion. The court of criminal appeals decided in each case that there was an abuse of discretion because the prosecutor failed to weigh all the relevant factors in reaching his decision to deny pretrial diversion to the defendant and remanded the case to the trial court to order the prosecutor to approve the defendant's pretrial diversion application. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a prosecutor has abused his discretion by failing to consider and weigh all the relevant pretrial diversion factors or by considering and relying upon an irrelevant factor, the appropriate remedy is to vacate the prosecutor's ruling and remand to the prosecutor to consider and weigh all of the relevant factors. Remanded. View "State v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed petitions for post-conviction relief challenging his 1985 conviction and life sentence for the first degree felony murder of John Pierce, his 1989 conviction for the first degree felony murder of Novella Webb, and his 1995 death sentence for the Webb murder. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed Smith's conviction and sentence for the Pierce murder, holding that Smith's post-conviction claims were barred by the statute of limitations; (2) affirmed Smith's conviction for the Webb murder, holding that Smith did not demonstrate he suffered prejudice resulting from his counsel's ineffective assistance in failing to adequately question the potential jurors during voir dire; (3) vacated Smith's death sentence, holding that Smith's counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to adequately investigate and present evidence supporting his motion to recuse the judge at his resentencing hearing, which resulted in a denial of Smith's due process right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal; and (4) held that Smith was entitled to a new hearing on the question of whether he was intellectually disabled at the time of the Webb murder because the lower courts applied an incorrect legal standard in determining Smith's functional IQ. Remanded. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to theft, and the trial court imposed a three-year sentence in the community corrections program. Defendant violated a condition of his release shortly after September 30, 2003, and the trial court entered an order of revocation, directing Defendant to serve the duration of his sentence in prison and giving credit for time served from the date of his sentence until September 30, 2003. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court should have awarded credit for time served in the program through July 27, 2004, the date the revocation warrant was signed. The court of criminal appeals reversed, holding that the credit should have extended until the issuance of the revocation warrant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the filing date of the revocation warrants begins the tolling of sentence credits. Remanded. View "State v. McNack" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Petitioner of premeditated first degree murder and attempted first degree murder and imposed a sentence of death. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of his trial counsel. Petitioner filed a motion asking the trial court to limit any cross-examination of Petitioner, asserting his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The post-conviction trial court denied the request, and Petitioner did not testify. The court of criminal appeals affirmed, holding that Petitioner's right against self-incrimination applies in the post-conviction context, but a petitioner who elects to testify is bound to answer relevant questions on cross-examination. The Supreme Court declined to decide whether and in what manner the constitutional right against self-incrimination applies in the post-conviction context and instead resolved the appeal on non-constitutional grounds. The Court vacated the trial court and court of criminal appeals, holding (1) the scope of cross-examination of a post-conviction petitioner is governed by Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, 8(C)(1)(d); and (2) the lower courts deprived Petitioner of the limited scope cross-examination provided in Rule 28. Remanded for a new post-conviction hearing. View "Keough v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner Henry Felts was convicted of aggravated burglary and attempted murder. Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court vacated Petitioner's conviction, finding that trial counsel's representation was ineffective because he (1) failed to pursue the defense of attempted voluntary manslaughter and (2) advised Petitioner not to testify when he had promised the jury that Petitioner would testify. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the courts below erred in finding trial counsel's performance deficient where (1) trial counsel chose a single, reasonable defense theory to the exclusion of another plausible, but inconsistent theory; and (2) trial counsel's decision not to call Petitioner as a witness was consistent with his altered trial strategy. View "Felts v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant Christopher Davis was convicted of aggravated robbery, carjacking, attempt to commit especially aggravated kidnapping, and attempt to commit first degree murder. The court of criminal appeals affirmed the convictions. On appeal, Defendant challenged (1) the legality of the stop of a vehicle in which he was a passenger that led to his arrest; and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for attempt to commit first degree murder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) reasonable suspicion existed to permit law enforcement officers to conduct a brief investigatory stop of the car in which Defendant was a passenger; and (2) there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Defendant and his fellow perpetrator planned and intended to kill the victim, and that Defendant's conduct, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, constituted a substantial step sufficient to support a conviction for attempted murder. View "State v. Davis" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted for a murder that occurred nearly ten years prior to his arrest. Defendant's theory of the case implicated two other men, who had previously been tried and acquitted of the murder, as the individuals responsible for the murder. Over the objection of Defendant, the State introduced evidence of the prior acquittals of the other men. A jury convicted Defendant of facilitation of first degree murder. The court of criminal appeals reversed, holding that the evidence of the acquittals of the other parties was irrelevant and that the erroneous admission of the evidence was not harmless. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the facts of this case, the evidence of a prior acquittal of an individual for the crime for which the defendant is on trial is not relevant as context evidence, relevant to the credibility of the witness, or relevant to rebut a defense theory that the other individual committed the crime; and (2) the erroneous admission of the evidence was not harmless. Remanded for a new trial. View "State v. Turner" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant Joshua Parker was convicted of second degree murder and attempted rape. The court of criminal appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of attempt to commit rape but reversed and vacated Defendant's conviction of second degree murder, holding (1) there was insufficient evidence to support Defendant's conviction, (2) State v. Mellons did not control the outcome of this case, (3) sufficient proof must support every element of the offense of which a defendant is convicted, even where the conviction offense is charged as a lesser-included offense and sufficient proof supports the greater offense, and (4) the trial court erred in charging the jury with second degree murder as a lesser-included offense of first degree felony murder. Because the proof was sufficient to support the offense of reckless homicide, remanded for entry of an amended judgment reflecting a conviction of reckless homicide and sentencing on reckless homicide. View "State v. Parker" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery and was sentenced to six years of enhanced probation. During the proceedings, the trial court did not warn Defendant that, upon the expiration of his sentence, he would be subjected to lifetime community supervision, which is mandated by statute for Defendant's conviction. Before Defendant's sentence expired, the State filed a petition to amend the judgment to include lifetime community supervision. The trial court corrected the judgment, and Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion. The court of criminal appeals affirmed, holding that Defendant had been adequately informed of the lifetime community supervision requirement by his trial counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the trial court failed to warn Defendant of the mandatory nature of lifetime community supervision, as was required by the Court's recent ruling in Ward v. State, and because the State was unable to establish that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Defendant was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea. Remanded. View "State v. Nagele" on Justia Law

Employee suffered a work-related injury and sought benefits. The benefit review conference at the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (DOL) ended in an impasse after a dispute about the degree of Employee's medical impairment. Employee filed suit. Subsequently, Employer filed an application for medical impairment rating (MIR) with the DOL, seeking the appointment of an independent medical examiner pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 50-6-204(d)(5). The trial court granted Employee's motion to quash the MIR, holding that the statute was established for the purpose of resolving workers' compensation claims while the claim was before an administrative body, and therefore, DOL had relinquished jurisdiction when the benefit review process reached an impasse. The trial court then adopted the higher of the disputed impairment ratings. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the constitutional separation of powers question was not properly presented, argued, or litigated before the trial court; and (2) whether the Employer may attempt to resolve the dispute of degree of medical impairment by seeking the opinion of an independent medical examiner pursuant to the statute was an issue for the Employee, Employer, and Attorney General to address on remand. View "Mansell v. Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire" on Justia Law