Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1987, Pervis Payne was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of assault with intent to commit first-degree murder, receiving two death sentences and a thirty-year imprisonment term. The court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, anticipating potential future commutation of the death sentences to life sentences. Decades later, following a legal pathway established by the Tennessee legislature, Payne was adjudicated intellectually disabled, leading to the vacating of his death sentences and their replacement with life sentences. The trial court also ordered that Payne’s sentences be served concurrently, making him eligible for parole in 2026.The Shelby County Criminal Court adjudicated Payne intellectually disabled and vacated his death sentences, substituting them with life sentences. The court also revisited the consecutive sentencing determination and ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. The State appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the trial court had discretion to consider the manner of service of the sentences after vacating the death penalty.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to realign Payne’s sentences. The court affirmed the modification of Payne’s death sentences to life imprisonment but vacated the part of the trial court’s judgment that ordered the sentences to be served concurrently. The court emphasized that once a criminal judgment becomes final, it may not be modified unless a statute or rule authorizes its modification. The court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State of Tennessee v. Payne" on Justia Law

Petitioner Dudley King and eight other individuals consigned their recreational vehicles (RVs) to Music City RV, LLC (MCRV), an RV dealer, for sale. On August 28, 2008, an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition was filed against MCRV in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The issue before the bankruptcy court was whether the consigned RVs were part of the bankruptcy estate. The parties stipulated that MCRV was not primarily engaged in selling consigned vehicles, was a merchant under UCC § 9-102(20), and performed the services of a consignee. None of the consignors filed a UCC-1 financing statement.The Bankruptcy Trustee argued that the consigned RVs were governed by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and were subordinate to the rights of perfected lien creditors, including the Trustee. Mr. King contended that the consignment was a true consignment of "consumer goods" and not a sale, thus not covered by the UCC, and the RVs should not be part of the estate. The bankruptcy court certified a question to the Supreme Court of Tennessee regarding whether such a consignment is covered under Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-2-326.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the statutory language and the Official Comments to the UCC. The court concluded that the 2001 amendment to Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-2-326 removed consignment transactions from the scope of Article 2. The court held that the consignment of an RV by a consumer to a Tennessee RV dealer for the purpose of selling the RV to a third person is not covered under section 47-2-326 of the UCC as adopted in Tennessee. The court assessed the costs of the appeal to the respondent, Robert H. Waldschmidt, Trustee. View "State of Tennessee v. Brown" on Justia Law

The case involves a healthcare liability action filed by the plaintiff, Payton Castillo, against CHI Memorial Hospital and other entities and physicians, alleging negligence in the care provided to her husband, who died shortly after being discharged from the hospital's emergency room. The defendants sought a protective order based on the quality improvement committee (QIC) privilege under Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-11-272 to prevent inquiry into a meeting held by the hospital and the decedent's family. The trial court denied the defendants' motion.The Hamilton County Circuit Court initially reviewed the case and denied the defendants' motion for a protective order, finding that statements made during the meeting were not protected by the QIC privilege. The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the statements made in the meeting were not protected by the QIC privilege.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that the QIC privilege applied to statements made during the meeting that were based on information obtained during the QIC process. However, the court found that Memorial waived the privilege when hospital management voluntarily disclosed the privileged information during the meeting with Mrs. Castillo. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals on separate grounds and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Castillo v. Rex" on Justia Law

Vanessa Turner (formerly Vanessa Colley) and John S. Colley, III were divorced in 2012, with a marital dissolution agreement (MDA) and a permanent parenting plan incorporated into the final decree. Post-divorce, John filed a petition to terminate his transitional alimony obligation, alleging Vanessa was cohabiting with her fiancé. Vanessa defended the alimony award, and after extensive litigation, John nonsuited his petition before it was adjudicated on the merits.The Circuit Court for Davidson County awarded Vanessa $16,500 in attorney fees, finding it reasonably necessary for her to defend the alimony award. John appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that neither party was a "prevailing party" under the MDA or Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c) because the petition was nonsuited before a decision on the merits.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that Vanessa was the prevailing party under both the MDA and section 36-5-103(c). The Court reasoned that the MDA's language entitled Vanessa to attorney fees as the prevailing party because she successfully defended the alimony award, achieving her objective of maintaining the status quo. The Court also held that under section 36-5-103(c), a party defending against a petition to alter or modify an alimony award can be considered a prevailing party even if the petition is nonsuited before a decision on the merits.The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, affirmed the trial court's award of attorney fees to Vanessa, and awarded her attorney fees on appeal. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine the amount of reasonable attorney fees for the appeals. View "Colley v. Colley" on Justia Law

In 2014, Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. (EMCF) filed a putative class action against BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc. (BCBST), alleging breach of contract due to a cap on certain payments for medical services. The trial court denied class certification, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. EMCF then voluntarily nonsuited its claims. After a favorable ruling in a separate lawsuit against TennCare, EMCF refiled its case against BCBST, again seeking class certification.The trial court held that collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of class certification, but the Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the prior class certification denial was not final for collateral estoppel purposes because the case had been voluntarily nonsuited.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case to determine whether the prior denial of class certification, affirmed on appeal, was entitled to preclusive effect. The Court held that the trial court's and appellate court's decisions denying class certification in the earlier case were final and binding for purposes of collateral estoppel. The Court reasoned that the class certification issue had been fully litigated and decided, and the decision was subject to appeal, which EMCF did not pursue further. Therefore, EMCF was precluded from relitigating the class certification issue in the refiled case.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court, reinstating the order striking the class action allegations against BCBST and VSHP. The Court emphasized that the denial of class certification, affirmed on appeal, was sufficiently final to warrant preclusive effect, preventing EMCF from seeking a do-over on class certification. View "Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc." on Justia Law

An elderly woman with severely impaired cognitive functioning was a resident at a skilled nursing facility. While an employee was helping her shower, the employee took a personal video call and propped her phone in a way that displayed the resident’s nude body to the caller. The resident’s conservator sued the facility for invasion of privacy. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the facility, and the plaintiff appealed. During the appeal, the resident died, and her estate was substituted as the plaintiff.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the complaint stated a valid claim for invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion and that the claim did not abate upon the resident’s death. The defendant facility was granted permission to appeal on the issue of abatement.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that under Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-5-102, a cause of action for invasion of privacy based on intrusion upon seclusion does not abate upon the death of the person whose privacy was invaded. The court determined that the statutory exception for “wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff” did not apply to this case. Therefore, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the claim for intrusion upon seclusion did not abate upon the resident’s death and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Jones v. Life Care Centers of America" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an at-will employee, was terminated by her employer, a private organization, after she sent emails to members of the Tennessee General Assembly expressing grievances about the employer's COVID-19 vaccination mandate. The employer claimed the emails violated its policies. The plaintiff sued for retaliatory discharge, asserting her termination violated her right to petition under Article I, Section 23 of the Tennessee Constitution.The Chancery Court for Hamilton County dismissed the complaint, holding that the right to petition did not apply to private employers. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the right to petition could serve as a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, thus allowing the plaintiff's claim to proceed.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that the right to petition in the Tennessee Constitution is enforceable only against governmental entities, not private parties. The court emphasized that the historical context of the right to petition, dating back to early England, was intended to protect against government oppression, not to constrain private parties. The court noted that no state has held that the right to petition limits the ability of private employers to terminate at-will employees. Consequently, the court concluded that private employers do not violate a clear public policy by terminating employees for exercising the right to petition.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, holding that at-will employees cannot base claims of retaliatory discharge against private employers on the right to petition in the Tennessee Constitution. View "Smith v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee" on Justia Law

Robin M. McNabb, a former Municipal Court Judge for Lenoir City, filed an election contest against Gregory H. Harrison, who won the election for the same position in 2022. McNabb argued that Harrison was ineligible to serve because he had not resided within the Lenoir City corporate limits for the year preceding the election, as required by Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution.The Chancery Court for Loudon County found that the term "district" in Article VI, Section 4 referred to the modern-day judicial district. Since Harrison resided in the Ninth Judicial District, the court ruled him eligible to serve. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision but modified the judgment, stating that "district" referred to Loudon County, not the Ninth Judicial District, because the Lenoir City Municipal Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Loudon County General Sessions Court.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and disagreed with the lower courts. It held that Article VI, Section 4 requires a candidate for a municipal judgeship to be a resident of the same municipality to which they will be assigned. Therefore, Harrison needed to reside in Lenoir City for one year prior to the election. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the Chancery Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "McNabb v. Harrison" on Justia Law

The case involves a road-rage incident in Marion County, Tennessee, where William Rimmel, III, aggressively pursued Bobbie Burke on the interstate while riding his motorcycle. Rimmel eventually broke the passenger window of Burke’s car using the slide of a loaded handgun. Although Rimmel never fired the handgun or pointed it at Burke, she was unaware that the object used to break the window was a gun. A jury convicted Rimmel of attempted aggravated assault and felony reckless endangerment with a handgun.The Circuit Court for Marion County sentenced Rimmel to two years of probation for the attempted aggravated assault conviction and one year of probation for the reckless endangerment with a handgun conviction, among other sentences for misdemeanor convictions. Rimmel's motions for a new trial and judgment of acquittal were denied. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that a rational juror could conclude that Rimmel took a substantial step toward causing Burke to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury and that his conduct created a reasonable probability of danger.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and affirmed Rimmel’s conviction for attempted aggravated assault, concluding that the evidence showed Rimmel intended to place Burke in reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury by using a handgun and took a substantial step toward doing so. However, the court reversed Rimmel’s conviction for felony reckless endangerment with a handgun, finding that the evidence did not establish that Rimmel’s conduct placed Burke in imminent danger of serious bodily injury or death. The court dismissed the indictment for felony reckless endangerment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "State v. Rimmel" on Justia Law

Leah Gilliam had a personalized license plate reading "69PWNDU" for over a decade. The State of Tennessee revoked the plate, deeming it offensive. Gilliam sued state officials, claiming that Tennessee's personalized license plate program discriminates based on viewpoint, violating the First Amendment. The State argued that the alphanumeric characters on personalized plates are government speech, not subject to the First Amendment's prohibition of viewpoint discrimination.The Davidson County Chancery Court, a three-judge panel, ruled in favor of the State, concluding that the alphanumeric combinations on personalized plates are government speech. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, finding that the personalized plates are private speech. The appellate court focused on the history of personalized plates, public perception, and the State's control over the messages, concluding that these factors did not support the State's argument.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the alphanumeric combinations on Tennessee's personalized license plates are government speech. The court applied the reasoning from Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., which held that Texas's specialty license plate designs were government speech. The court found that the history of license plates, public perception, and the State's control over the messages all supported the conclusion that personalized alphanumeric combinations are government speech. Consequently, the court reinstated the trial court's judgment in favor of the State. View "Gilliam v. Gerregano" on Justia Law