Justia Tennessee Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Clayton D. Richards underwent a medical procedure at Vanderbilt University Medical Center (VUMC) in August 2013, resulting in bilateral lower extremity paralysis. He initially filed a negligence lawsuit against VUMC in December 2014, which he later voluntarily dismissed. Richards refiled his complaint in January 2021, relying on Tennessee's saving statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-105, which allows a plaintiff to refile a lawsuit within one year of a voluntary nonsuit. However, the trial court dismissed his complaint, ruling that Richards did not comply with the saving statute's terms.The Circuit Court for Davidson County dismissed Richards' refiled complaint, holding that it was not filed within the one-year period required by the saving statute. Richards argued that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) provided him with a 120-day extension to the one-year saving statute, making his lawsuit timely. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal, agreeing that the 120-day extension did not apply to the saving statute.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) does not extend the one-year refiling period provided by the saving statute. The court emphasized that the 120-day extension applies only to statutes of limitations and repose, not to the saving statute. Consequently, Richards' refiled complaint was untimely, and the trial court's dismissal of the case was upheld. View "Richards v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center" on Justia Law

Charles Youree, Jr. filed a lawsuit against two business entities, Recovery House of East Tennessee, LLC and RHT Holdings, LLC, seeking to hold them liable for a judgment he previously obtained against another entity, Recovery Solutions Network, LLC (RSN), by piercing the corporate veil. When the defendants did not respond, a default judgment was entered against them. The defendants moved to vacate the default judgment, arguing that the complaint did not plead the necessary elements for piercing the corporate veil and that their failure to respond was due to excusable neglect, though they later withdrew the excusable neglect argument. The trial court denied the motion to vacate, finding that the complaint stated a claim under the Allen factors.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the correct standard for piercing the corporate veil was the three-element test from Continental Bankers Life Insurance Co. of the South v. Bank of Alamo, rather than the Allen factors. The appellate court found that the complaint failed to plead the necessary elements under the Continental Bankers standard and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that the Continental Bankers elements are the correct framework for piercing the corporate veil in all cases, whether involving a parent-subsidiary relationship or a corporation-shareholder relationship. The court found that the plaintiff's complaint did not sufficiently allege the elements required under the Continental Bankers standard, specifically the elements of control used to commit fraud or wrong and causation of injury. Consequently, the trial court erred in denying the motion to vacate the default judgment. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Youree v. Recovery House of East Tennessee, LLC" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant was convicted in 2022 for unlawful possession of a firearm after having been previously convicted of a felony crime of violence. The State introduced a certified judgment of conviction for the defendant’s 2017 robbery conviction, and the trial judge instructed the jury that robbery is a crime of violence. However, robbery is not included in the statutory definition of crimes of violence under Tennessee law. The defendant received a ten-year sentence.The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction, concluding that robbery is a crime of violence despite its absence from the statutory definition. The defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to establish that robbery was a crime of violence.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case to determine whether robbery is encompassed within the statutory definition of “crime of violence” and whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the conviction. The Court concluded that the statutory list of crimes of violence is illustrative, not exhaustive, and that robbery can be considered a crime of violence. However, the Court held that whether a specific robbery is a crime of violence is a question for a properly instructed jury, not the trial judge.The Court found that the State did not present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant’s prior robbery was a crime of violence. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed, in part, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals, vacated the trial court’s judgment on Count 1, and remanded the case for entry of a new judgment reducing the conviction to a Class E felony and for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "State v. Curry" on Justia Law

Robert Trentham slipped and fell on a pedestrian bridge at the Venue at Cool Springs apartment complex in Franklin, Tennessee, owned by Mid-America Apartments, LP (MAA). The incident occurred on a rainy morning, and Trentham sustained serious injuries. He filed a premises-liability lawsuit against MAA, alleging negligence in maintaining the bridge, which he claimed had microbial growth that caused his fall.The Circuit Court for Williamson County found in favor of Trentham, determining that MAA was on constructive notice of the dangerous condition due to the microbial growth. The court concluded that MAA had breached its duty of care and awarded Trentham damages. MAA appealed the decision, arguing that it was not on constructive notice of the dangerous condition.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the evidence supported the finding that MAA was on constructive notice of the microbial growth on the bridge. The appellate court upheld the trial court's conclusions regarding MAA's duty, breach, and the resulting damages.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that MAA was on constructive notice of the dangerous condition on the pedestrian bridge. The court referenced Blair v. West Town Mall, which allows for constructive notice to be established by showing a pattern of conduct, a recurring incident, or a general or continuing condition. The court found that the microbial growth on the bridge constituted a general or continuing condition, making it reasonably foreseeable to MAA. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, holding that MAA breached its duty of care to Trentham. View "Trentham v. Mid-America Apartments, LP" on Justia Law

Pharma Conference Education, Inc. entered into an agreement with the University of Tennessee Health Science Center to produce pharmaceutical continuing education programs "as is feasible." The Health Science Center terminated the agreement before any programs were held. Pharma sued to enforce the agreement, but the State argued that the agreement lacked consideration and was not a valid contract. The key issue was whether the promise to produce programs "as is feasible" constituted consideration or was an illusory promise.The Tennessee Claims Commission granted summary judgment in favor of the State, concluding that the agreement lacked consideration because Pharma's promise was illusory. The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that Pharma's promise gave it complete discretion and was therefore illusory. Both courts relied on the deposition testimony of Pharma's president, John W. Smith, to support their conclusions.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that Pharma's promise to produce as many programs "as is feasible" constitutes adequate consideration. The Court explained that the term "feasible" has an objective meaning and does not give Pharma unfettered discretion. The Court also noted that the statutory presumption of consideration under Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-50-103 applies, and the State failed to rebut this presumption. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the Claims Commission for further proceedings, including consideration of the State's argument regarding mutual assent. View "Pharma Conference Education, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law

Robert E. Lee Flade filed a lawsuit against several defendants, including Stephanie Isaacs and the Bedford County Listening Project (BCLP), over disparaging remarks made on social media. Isaacs and the BCLP filed motions to dismiss under Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and petitions to dismiss under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (TPPA), seeking dismissal with prejudice, attorney’s fees, and sanctions. Before the trial court could hear these motions, Flade voluntarily dismissed his complaint without prejudice. Isaacs and the BCLP requested the court to adjudicate their TPPA petitions despite the dismissal, but the trial court declined, stating the nonsuit concluded the matter.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the TPPA petitions did not limit Flade’s right to a voluntary nonsuit under Rule 41.01(1). The court reasoned that the TPPA did not specifically limit the right to a nonsuit and that the mere filing of a TPPA petition did not create a vested right that would prevent a voluntary dismissal.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment. The court held that the right to take a voluntary nonsuit is not subject to the provisions of the TPPA under Rule 41.01(1). It also concluded that there is no vested right to adjudication of a TPPA petition pending at the time of a voluntary nonsuit and that a TPPA petition does not constitute a counterclaim for purposes of Rule 41.01(1). Therefore, the trial court correctly declined to adjudicate the TPPA petitions after Flade voluntarily dismissed his complaint. View "Flade v. City of Shelbyville, Tennessee" on Justia Law

During a routine traffic stop, law enforcement conducted an open-air sniff using a drug-sniffing canine. The canine alerted to the vehicle, leading officers to search it without a warrant under the automobile exception. Inside a backpack, they found marijuana, a loaded handgun, Ziploc bags, and a scale. The defendant, a passenger, was indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver; possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the canine could not distinguish between legal hemp and illegal marijuana.The trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the charges, finding the canine's reliability was not established due to its inability to differentiate between hemp and marijuana. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the smell of illegal marijuana provides probable cause to search a vehicle and that law enforcement had probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and clarified that a positive alert from a drug-sniffing canine does not establish a per se rule of probable cause but should be considered within the totality of the circumstances. The court held that a positive indication from a drug-sniffing canine may still contribute to a finding of probable cause despite the legalization of hemp. Examining the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that law enforcement had probable cause to search the vehicle. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, reinstating the indictments against the defendant and remanding for further proceedings. View "State v. Green" on Justia Law

In this case, the original plaintiff, Ora Eads, Jr., obtained legal title to a commercial property in Nashville but did not register the deed. Years later, the seller defaulted on a loan, and a creditor obtained a judgment lien against the property, which was eventually sold. The plaintiffs argued that Mr. Eads had adversely possessed the property during the intervening years, while the defendant, the subsequent purchaser, contended that Mr. Eads’s possession was not adverse.The Davidson County Chancery Court ruled in favor of the defendant, finding that Mr. Eads’s possession was not adverse due to the permissive nature of his relationship with the original owner, Mr. Whiteaker. The court noted that Mr. Whiteaker had acquiesced in Mr. Eads’s use of the property and that the deed, installment note, and other facts indicated a non-adverse relationship. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that Mr. Eads had acquired title to the property by common-law adverse possession, as his possession was not with the permission of anyone.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, reinstating the chancery court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that adversity, for purposes of adverse possession, requires a conflict of title or a controversy about the right to possess the property. Since Mr. Eads had obtained legal title through a valid deed, albeit unregistered, there was no conflict of title or controversy regarding possession between him and Mr. Whiteaker. Therefore, Mr. Eads did not satisfy the requirements for statutory or common-law adverse possession. The court concluded that Mr. Eads’s possession was not adverse to Mr. Whiteaker, and any adversity to other parties did not last long enough to meet the statutory periods required for adverse possession. View "Mathes v. 99 Hermitage, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants committed fraud related to property rights. The defendants, through their business, REO Holdings, LLC, bought properties at tax sales and used redemption rights to obtain titles, some of which were later found to be fraudulent. The case involved four specific properties where the defendants allegedly used misrepresentation and forged documents to redeem and sell the properties at a profit.The Chancery Court for Davidson County initially dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for unjust enrichment and misappropriation of redemption rights, finding that unjust enrichment required a voluntary conferral of a benefit and that Tennessee law did not recognize conversion of intangible property rights. The court also denied class certification. After a jury trial, the plaintiffs moved for a new trial, arguing that the evidence preponderated against the jury’s verdict. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the trial court misconceived its role as thirteenth juror.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that remand for the trial court to fulfill its role as thirteenth juror is an appropriate remedy when a civil trial court misconceives that role or applies an incorrect standard. The court also held that a claim for unjust enrichment does not require a voluntary conferral of a benefit, overruling previous case law to the extent it held otherwise. Finally, the court affirmed that Tennessee law does not recognize a claim for misappropriation or conversion of a right of redemption. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. View "Family Trust Services LLC v. Green Wise Homes LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a defamation claim brought by Bill Charles, a real estate professional and president of the homeowners' association of the Durham Farms community in Hendersonville, Tennessee, against Donna McQueen, a resident of the same community. McQueen had posted a critical review of Charles on Google, accusing him of using misleading tactics to deceive home buyers. Charles filed a defamation and false light claim against McQueen, who sought dismissal of the claims under the Tennessee Public Participation Act, arguing that Charles could not establish a prima facie case for his claims because he could not prove actual malice.The trial court agreed with McQueen and dismissed the claims. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, agreeing that Charles had to prove actual malice for his false light claim but holding that Charles was not a public figure and therefore did not need to prove actual malice for his defamation claim.The Supreme Court of Tennessee disagreed with the Court of Appeals, holding that Charles is a limited-purpose public figure given his voluntary and prominent role in a controversy concerning changes to the Durham Farms development plan. The court further held that Charles failed to establish a prima facie case of actual malice. The court also rejected Charles’s argument that McQueen waived her request for appellate attorney’s fees by failing to list it as an issue in her Court of Appeals brief. The court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and affirmed in part, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Charles v. McQueen" on Justia Law